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Introduction 
 Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your 
way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way 
about. (PI, 203) 
 
 Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, 
of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this 
surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform 
houses. (PI, 18) 
 
 While language may be ancient and labyrinthine, Wittgenstein’s metaphors retain 
their vision when applied to philosophy in general. Together they serve as an 
enlightening depiction of historical approaches to philosophical problems. Many 
philosophical problems have been abandoned and fallen into decay; others apparently 
solved. Some have taken new forms and others have been only recently discovered. 
Careful study of seemingly unrelated fields of philosophy reveals a deep interconnection 
between them all, which gives rise to much commerce and growth in the discipline as a 
whole. While we are free to choose our entrance to this bustling metropolis of 
philosophical problems, we must tread carefully to avoid a hasty choice of route into 
town, lest we find ourselves lost in a bad neighborhood. Hopefully our decision to enter 
via the philosophy of language will not lead us astray. 
  There are two important preliminary questions that deserve attention before any 
trip: where do we plan on going and why are we taking this route as opposed to others. 
Accordingly, the first purpose of this introduction will be to give a general justification of 
adopting the route of the philosophy of language. Its second purpose will be to describe 
the structure of the arguments below. This section gives a clear statement of the overall 
project of this essay and lays out the relationship between the chapters.  
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Assumptions and Justifications 
 How our words possess meaning is one of the premiere problems within the 
philosophy of language, and seems to be of fundamental importance for philosophy as a 
whole. Language is the medium through which all philosophical problems are expressed, 
and if the articulation of any particular problem can be shown to be incoherent or 
meaningless, we can re-label the problem as a pseudo-problem and dismiss it 
accordingly. Throughout history, many philosophers have adopted varying versions of 
this method, but, as the title suggests, the philosophical grandfather of this essay is 
Wittgenstein. Indeed, while he distances himself in his later writings from logical 
positivism as well as his earlier thought, he embraces this general methodology 
explicitly: 
 It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a 
mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a 
clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the 
contradiction is resolved. (And this does not mean that one is sidestepping a difficulty.) 
 The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique for a game, and 
that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we 
are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules. 
 This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear 
view of). 
 It throws light on our concept of meaning something. (PI, 125) 
 
One of the primary functions of philosophy consists in explaining how our words possess 
meaning; doing so provides a clear view of what exactly it is that troubles us. That this is 
the sole function of philosophy is not a position of Wittgenstein’s that I wish to defend. It 
seems to require a robust philosophical argument to support itself and so, needless to say, 
I find the former weaker claim much more immediately plausible. In any case, explaining 
how our words possess meaning often has the power of showing us what the true nature 
of our problems is. More importantly, the upshot of this assumption entails that we might 
discover something in this process that reveals our previous approaches to our problems 
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as fallacious. For example, once we discover that we can not really mean that mental 
states are “objects” in the mind of a person, we quickly see how traditional Cartesian 
assumptions about the mind become problematic. However, we can start looking for what 
they might in fact be in light of our philosophical reflections on language. The discussion 
below relies broadly on this assumption. Using this as a starting point, it is my intention 
to connect a specific novel conception of meaning to inform our understanding of mental 
states and the self, which, if done properly, will give credence to this method. More 
generally, this method assumes that the insights of philosophy of language can inform our 
discussions in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind specifically. 
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Outline 
 The central claim of this essay argues that there is an important relationship 
between Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule following and meaning with his discussion of 
solipsism. Historically, Wittgenstein always considered solipsism an important target. 
Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker even bring us evidence that the fly in Wittgenstein’s 
infamous fly-bottle is the solipsist: 
 ‘The solipsist flutters and flutters in the flyglass, strikes against the walls, 
flutters further. How can he be brought to rest?’ Note that in MS 165 Wittgenstein states 
explicitly that the discussion of a private language concerns the problems of idealism and 
solipsism. (Baker and Hacker 1984, p. 23) 
 
Extensive literature exists concerning Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following (e.g. 
Kripke 1982, Boghossian 1989, 1994, Baker and Hacker 1984, etc.) and much has been 
written on his discussion of solipsism later in the Philosophical Investigations (e.g. 
Hacker 1972, Minar 1998, Sluga 1996).  However, there is not much literature tracing 
connections between these two lines of thought in Wittgenstein. My claim in this essay is 
that Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following and meaning leaves us with a radically 
novel conception of the meaningfulness of language and that this in turn underpins his 
rejection of Cartesian dualism and traditional assumptions about the self that inform both 
realist and solipsistic positions. These connections are based largely off the first part of 
the Philosophical Investigations. In tracing these connections I hope to defend 
Wittgenstein’s position as a tenable alternative, though it needs more elucidation and 
elaboration in future research.  
 Chapter one focuses on dismantling what I call a ‘traditional assumption about 
meaning’ (TA), which claims that the meanings of words and the actual physical uses of 
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linguistic expressions themselves are two separate and discrete entities. Wittgenstein 
explicitly mentions this assumption as a ‘mistake’: 
The mistake we are liable to make could be expressed thus: We are looking for the use of 
a sign, but we look for it as though it were an object co-existing with the sign. (One of the 
reasons for this mistake is again that we are looking for a “thing corresponding to a 
substantive.”) (BB, p. 5) 
 
Here, Wittgenstein treats the ‘use’ of a sign as its meaning, whereas the ‘sign’ is akin to 
my ‘actual physical use’ of a linguistic expression (a sign). The arguments put forth come 
from Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations and are intended to provide strong 
reasons for pursuing a picture of meaning not dependent upon TA.  
 Chapter two sketches my take on Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning. The 
essential point of this chapter claims that meanings are not entities at all. Rather, the 
meaningfulness of any expression cannot be separated from the actions and 
circumstances surrounding an expression’s use. This point does not endorse TA, thereby 
avoiding the problems raised in the first chapter. An elaboration of this point consists in 
two main moves: (1) discussing the meaningfulness of our most primitive language, 
which consists of primitive gestures and sounds and (2) providing a possible way that we 
can use the meanings found in our more basic language to create more extensive 
meanings in the highly developed language we use today.  
 Chapter three connects the previous discussion of meaning to Wittgenstein’s 
famous private language argument (PLA). I draw a distinction between what I call the 
negative PLA and the positive PLA. The negative PLA concludes that there can be no 
private language if the meaning of our words is based off of TA. This means that no one 
can have a language that s/he in principle could only understand. However, the positive 
PLA concludes that an individual in isolation can develop a language, but not that this 
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language would be impossible for others to understand. While the conclusion of the 
negative PLA follows implicitly from the results of the first chapter, I offer the entire 
PLA here as a way of recapping our results and completing the previous discussions. The 
chapter then connects these discussions to the Cartesian assumption (CA) that mind and 
body are distinct substances and elucidates the new picture we should have of the 
meaning of our sensation language. This new picture rejects CA, advocating a kind of 
primitive notion of a human being from which the notions of mind and body are derived.  
Our sensation language depends on this primitive notion of a human being, even though 
it is an augmented refinement of our primitive language. 
 Chapter four takes the conclusions of the previous chapters and applies them to 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of solipsism. After articulating the solipsist’s position, I point 
out that this position relies on a notion of meaning and privacy based off of TA and CA 
that we have rejected as being untenable. Therefore, the solipsist’s thesis is not genuinely 
meaningful. This makes the solipsism incoherent, in which case we can dismiss solipsism 
as a possible position.
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Chapter One: 
The Rule-Following Problem 
 A large part of the Philosophical Investigations is devoted to what have been 
labeled “The rule-following considerations”. Unfortunately, these arguments are not 
simple, and have generated conflicting exegeses (Kripke 1982, Baker and Hacker 1984). 
Wittgenstein’s style might be aesthetically pleasing and original, but it certainly does not 
facilitate a univocal interpretation. In any case, the arguments in this chapter focus on 
attacking a central traditional assumption about meaning via the rule following 
considerations. Generally speaking, ‘the traditional assumption about meaning’ (TA) 
claims that there is a sharp distinction between physical uses of linguistic expressions and 
the ‘meanings’ that attach to them. These are two separate and discrete entities, and it is 
the job of the philosopher to establish the relationship between them.  
 This chapter begins by stating the problem and some initial responses, followed in 
the second section by a critique of the dispositional response. The third section of this 
chapter attacks two substantial responses to Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations. 
One adopts a broadly Fregean distinction between meaning (sense) and linguistic 
statements while the other advocates a kind of Russellian conception of immediate 
acquaintance with sense-data that determines meaning. These are two highly influential 
ways in which meanings and linguistic expressions have been related, and so before 
going further I will spend some time to clearly illustrate the major assumptions of these 
positions that are relevant to our purposes. However, it should be noted that the aspects of 
the views highlighted below are not meant to apply solely to their respective fathers of 
thought. I mention these aspects of Frege’s and Russell’s thought to point out two highly 
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influential assumptions about meaning that are present in many other theories of 
meaning, which may or may not differ from Frege or Russell. These assumptions 
motivate responses to Wittgenstein’s questions, but all fall short of their goal. Ultimately, 
the chapter concludes with what I call the negative private language argument, which 
claims that there can be no act of private ostensive definition that determines the 
meaningfulness of words. Hence, no one can ‘obey a rule privately’. Since this kind of 
privacy is necessary for determining the meaningfulness of our words in both Frege’s and 
Russell’s theories, we must abandon them as viable accounts. 
 For Frege, each linguistic statement has a subject and predicate. These may also 
have their own senses and referents as well. Consider, for example, the sentence, 
 (1) Hilary Putnam is a mathematician. 
(1) has a subject, “Hilary Putnam” and a predicate “… is a mathematician”. The sense of 
“Hilary Putnam” is an abstract concept and this in turn fixes the referent, the actual man 
Hilary Putnam. The predicate plays a similar role. Its sense is an abstract functional 
concept that refers to an actual objective function. The former takes the senses of subjects 
while the latter takes actual objects as input values. The sense of (1) in its entirety is an 
abstract, objective meaning that results from the combination of the senses of the subject 
and predicate. The referent of (1) is a truth value obtained in an analogous relationship 
among the referents of the subject and predicate.1  
                                                 
1
 This is an admittedly cursory summary of Frege. For example, Frege holds that the subjects and 
predicates of linguistic statements may each lack a sense or a referent, respectively. “Unicorn” does not 
have a referent because there are no actual unicorns and “Trifflomite” does not have a sense because it has 
not been given one in our language. In the former case, any sentence using “Unicorn” as a subject would 
lack a truth value but still have a meaning while, in the latter case, a sentence using “Trifflomite” would 
also lack a meaning. Furthermore, Frege’s philosophy helps us deal with problems of reference, meaning, 
and knowledge, such as the infamous “Morning Star” and “Evening Star” problem, and many others 
besides. It is an admirable system on the whole, but for our purposes we shall focus on one particular aspect 
of it. 
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 The main aspect of Frege’s theory that chapter one’s critique focuses on is its 
notion of abstract meanings. For Frege, these are objective meanings that exist in a ‘third 
realm’. They are akin to Plato’s forms in several ways. They are immaterial, timeless, and 
we ‘grasp’ them with our minds. Furthermore, they can be ‘infinite objects’ thanks to 
their non-physical natures. That being said, Frege clearly endorses TA. We have a 
separate, even objective ‘meaning’ that is distinct from the linguistic entity with which it 
corresponds. Understanding the meaning of a sentence requires an act of private grasping 
of an objective object by our minds. The first chapter attacks this vital part of Frege’s 
thought.2  
 The intricacies of Russell’s thoughts on meaning are far too extensive to dwell on 
here, if not simply for the fact that he constantly changed his views throughout his 
lifetime. To make things slightly simpler, I will focus on his logical atomism and his 
general theory of meaning expressed therein. Russell’s logical atomism breaks down 
ordinary sentences, by means of logical analysis, into ‘logical atoms’, which are 
essentially sense-data of varying kinds.3 In “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, 
Russell says:  
 The reason that I call my doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms that I 
wish to arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical 
atoms. Some of them will be what I call ‘particulars’ – such things as little patches of 
colour or sounds, momentary things – and some of them will be predicates or relations 
and so on. (Russell 1985, p. 37) 
 
                                                 
2
 This is a woefully cursory summary of Frege, but I hesitate to dwell any further on elaborating his 
thought. The main point to emphasize is that meanings are objective abstract entities that we somehow 
grasp with our minds and that it is this process that establishes the connection between linguistic entities 
and meanings.  
3
 This is related to Russell’s endorsement of a kind of radical empiricism. For Russell, “Sense-data” include 
direct impressions of actual relations, qualities, and even facts. All of these are parts of our sense-data, not 
just sense-impressions of physical objects. I only note this here to avoid confusion about Russell’s stance. 
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Logical analysis takes our ‘complex’ ordinary sentences and breaks them up into their 
‘simple’ component parts. In the final analysis, we are left with completely simple 
symbols whose meanings come from direct acquaintance of particular sense-data.  
 All analysis is only possible in regard to what is complex, and it always 
depends, in the last analysis, upon direct acquaintance with the objects which are the 
meanings of certain simple symbols. (Russell 1985, p. 54) 
 
To understand the meanings of complex symbols, we must first understand the simple 
symbols of which they are composed, and the meanings of these symbols comes from 
direct acquaintance with particular objects of sense-experience. For example, Russell 
considers the word “red” to be paradigmatic of a simple symbol, and the meaning of red 
is known through direct acquaintance with red patches of color. 
 There are finer details of Russell’s logical analysis that warrant further discussion 
elsewhere but for our purposes the main points of his account lie in his emphasis on 
sense-data.4 Our ability to know the meanings of any symbol in our language, whether 
simple or complex, boils down to our ability to have direct acquaintance with relevant 
sense-data. This argument commits us to a Cartesian conception of the mind that divorces 
appearances (sense-data) from reality.5 The sense-data private to a particular subject 
determines the meaning of simple symbols, presumably by a means of some private 
ostensive definition. While many people adopt this influential aspect of Russell’s theory, 
doing so commits them to TA. The meaning of a symbol and the symbol itself are two 
separate and discrete entities. The meanings of simple symbols lie in private experience, 
which are determined by an act of private ostensive definition that establishes the 
                                                 
4
 For example, Russell’s discussion of the cognitive aspects involved in meaning seem relevant, though 
tangential, for our purposes (Russell, 45-6). His elaboration of analysis, definitions, and the meanings of 
complex symbols (Russell 54-7) is somewhat pertinent to this essay as well, if not for the sole fact that the 
later Wittgenstein criticized Russell on these points (PI 46, 55, 59, 60). 
5
 John McDowell discusses Russell’s Cartesian commitments thoroughly in his article, “Singular Thought 
and the Extent of Inner Space”. We will see the role Cartesianism plays later in the essay.  
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relationship between a simple symbol and its meaning. This is the notion that the 
arguments below refute. 
 
I. The Initial Problem 
 Mathematics is a language game extensively used by Wittgenstein to express his 
concerns, and also serves as a clear illustration of his problems. Consider the series: 
1) 2, 4, 6, 8, … 
We have been taught to regard this as the elementary series of even integers that any 
primary school student (or possibly even a child before formal schooling) will master. It 
follows the algebraic formula “2n” where “n” belongs to the set of integers. The main 
thrust of Wittgenstein’s rule-following sections is expressed by the question, “How does 
the student know how to go on in the correct manner?” In other words, how does the 
student come to know the correct meaning of “2n”? Given this finite sequence, any 
number of rules could occur to the student, such as: 
a.) 2n 
b.) 2n + (n-1)(n-2)(n-3)(n-4) 
c.) 2n for all n < 4, and 5 for all n >= 4 
These are just a few of the infinitely many possible rules that could occur to the pupil. 
This exact example is discussed by Wittgenstein in PI 185: 
 Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond 1000 – and he writes 
1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. 
 We say to him: “Look what you’ve done!” – He doesn’t understand. We say: 
“You were meant to add two: look how you began the series!” – He answers: “Yes, isn’t 
it right? I thought that was how I was meant to do it.” – Or suppose he pointed to the 
series and said: “But I went on in the same way.” – It would now be no use to say: “But 
can’t you see ….?” – and repeat the old examples and explanations. – In such a case we 
might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this person to understand our order with our 
explanations as we should understand the order: “Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 
3000 and so on.” (PI, 185) 
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Perhaps the difficulty is not readily apparent. It does not take a brilliant mathematician to 
realize that there could be any number of algebraic formulas that would give us different 
numbers for the value of n = 5, and, moreover, this is not problematic prima facie. Things 
become problematic when we try to pin down how it is possible for us to teach the rule 
“2n” to the student. When can we say that the pupil has learned the formula “2n” and not 
some other strange formula like “2n + (n-1)(n-2)(n-3)(n-4)”? Furthermore, how do we, as 
the teachers, accurately convey to the student that we mean “2n” and not “2n + (n-1)(n-
2)(n-3)(n-4)”? Clearly not after we have progressed along to a certain point in the series, 
for we can only physically demonstrate a finite segment of the series. Conversely, we 
cannot say that the student knows what rule he is following after any definite value of n, 
such as 20, or 100, etc.  
 The most immediate suggestion is to offer some explanation as the following. 
“Look, the series is meant to be quite simple. All the pupil has to do is add two after 
every spot in the series. He must do the same thing every time.” These are certainly 
instructions for the student to follow, but they are merely a more verbose expression of 
“2n”. This option does not offer any kind of solution because the problem cannot be 
addressed by simply substituting one linguistic expression of a rule for another. Even if 
one were to specify the new linguistic expression such that mathematical words like 
“add” or “two” were absent from it, we could still legitimately repeat our question at this 
more basic level. This strategy results in an infinite regress of substitutions of linguistic 
expressions for one another, and therefore lacks any explanatory power. 
 
II. The Dispositional Response 
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 The solution to this problem cannot be straightforward, so before diving into more 
complicated responses we should flesh out what Wittgenstein’s opponents can appeal to 
and how he intends to combat them. Firstly, Wittgenstein does not restrict possible 
explanations to purely physical or behavioristic options. One might want to brand his 
conclusions as a form of behaviorism, but, as Kripke points out (Kripke, 44), he does not 
assume behaviorism as a premise. This gives Wittgenstein’s interlocutor the ability to 
appeal to mental states when trying to respond to his rule following questions. 
Furthermore, Wittgenstein reacts against many of his earlier views expressed in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which implicitly adopt some form of TA. It is often 
helpful to view his interlocutor in the PI as an advocate of TA and, in some situations, as 
his younger self. Wittgenstein should be read as debating with these speakers on their 
own terms; he tries to show that they fail to adequately explain the meaningfulness of our 
language based on their own assumptions. 
 Since we have to look to something beyond a more careful description of the rule 
itself to help us, someone might insist “But I knew that the next number needed to be 10! 
I was thinking of this as I was teaching him, and that is what determined how I meant the 
correct next step.” Perhaps this person did have the next step in mind, but she could not 
have had all of the infinitely many correct steps in mind. It is simply impossible for her to 
have thought of every single member of this series because there are infinitely many of 
them. 
 Wittgenstein considers a more robust version of this response, which is essentially 
a response that appeals to the counter-factual, “If I had been asked what number came 
next, I would have responded with 10.” This could also be restated as a disposition to 
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behave in a certain way. The reason that the teacher meant to teach the pupil the rule, 
“2n” is that she was disposed to continue the series with “10, 12, 14, etc.” Furthermore, if 
she had been asked about any particular term in the series, she would have responded 
with the correct response because she has the necessary kind of disposition that accords 
with the rule. Kripke discusses the faults of the dispositional response at length in the 
second part of his celebrated essay, “Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language”, and 
the criticisms I put forth against dispositionalism will mirror Kripke’s. 
 The first reason for abandoning dispositionalism is that our dispositions are finite, 
which is ironic given that the move towards dispositionalism was intended to overcome 
problems about finitude, as Kripke points out: 
 The dispositional theory attempts to avoid the problem of finiteness of my actual 
past performance by appealing to a disposition. But in doing so, it ignores an obvious 
fact: not only my actual performance, but also the totality of my dispositions is finite. 
(Kripke 1982, p. 26) 
 
In the case of this series, it is easy to give the correct answer for any reasonable term in 
the series, say 15,000,000 or some smaller manageable number. We simply multiply 
these by two to get the correct answer. However, it seems less likely that I have a 
disposition to give the correct answer when asked to give the 235,986,857,100,883,345th 
term in the series. That really just seems like a huge mess of numbers, and while I could 
calculate the right answer, it will take some time and work (although a modest amount of 
each). More importantly, the main force of this criticism stems from the fact that there are 
simply numbers that are too large for us to have a disposition towards because we could 
never actually form a disposition towards them. There are infinitely many numbers, and 
we exist for only a finite amount of time. This means that we can only have a finite 
number of dispositions. Therefore, there are infinitely many numbers that we will never 
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be able to have a disposition towards in our life times simply because we will die before 
we can form any disposition towards them. How, then, are we to determine that the 
student is not following some rule such as: “2n for all n physically conceivable, and 7 for 
all n too large for us to form a disposition towards” rather than, “2n”? 
 This initial criticism is admittedly unappealing and seems to miss the value of the 
dispositional theory. “If we could overcome our physical limitations and actually grasp 
the number desired,” the dispositionalist might frustratingly reply, “we would respond in 
accordance with our dispositions and therefore give the correct term for the series.” This 
brings us to a more important point: since these dispositions are now theoretical 
dispositions that we would have under ideal conditions, how do we determine what we 
would be disposed to do? To say that our dispositions under ideal circumstances would 
be those that accord with the intended series would be circular because we are trying to 
figure out how anything can accord with the intended series at all. An appeal to ideal 
circumstances cannot overcome this problem with dispositionalism. 
 Another pressing worry with the dispositional account claims that this account 
lacks the normative component necessary for correct rule following. In point of fact, we 
are sometimes disposed to follow rules incorrectly. “Horse-looking” cows have become a 
popular example to illustrate this point (see Boghossian, 1989). Presumably, I have 
correctly learned what objects are to be considered “cows” and the others that are 
“horses”. But if I found myself in a sufficiently vague scenario, say a dark, foggy night 
and at a distance from a fairly abnormally shaped cow, I might be disposed to call the 
cow a horse. But this does not make it the case that “horse” means “either a horse or a 
cow”, though I am disposed to use it as such. More generally, the force of this objection 
 20
boils down to the fact that just because I feel that the next term in the series is ‘x’ does 
not make it the case that ‘x’ is the correct term. Just because I happen to be disposed in 
such a manner to react in such a way does not mean that this is the right way to respond.  
 I find these problems devastating for an adequate dispositionalist response to our 
problem. By adopting TA, we have to bring meaning and the actual uses of linguistic 
entities into accordance somehow, but a dispositional theory faces two difficult 
objections: (1) since the meaning of “2n” applies to infinitely many numbers, our 
dispositions fail to uniquely determine a meaning for any given expression and (2) since 
our dispositions are based on merely what we feel is right, we quickly run into extreme 
problems of relativism that prohibit us from correcting anyone’s application of a word. If 
the student continues the series “2n” past n = 100 and she starts writing, “204, 208, 212, 
etc.” we cannot legitimately reprimand her. Instead, we can only say, “Well, she was 
disposed to do this, so it must be right.” This arrests any possibility of teaching in the first 
place, because all of the students can only ace their tests!  
 
III. Frege’s and Russell’s Responses 
 At this point, we come to more weighty responses to Wittgenstein’s challenge. I 
will focus on Frege’s assumptions first because they pose less of a challenge to 
Wittgenstein. Some of the problems above are avoided by Frege. Frege postulated a 
mental faculty that we possess that allows us to ‘grasp’ objective meaning facts, or 
something of the kind. For Frege, the meanings of propositions are not subjective 
feelings; they are actual objective entities that we ‘grasp’ with our mental faculties. The 
objective nature of these entities overcomes several problems. Firstly, they could be 
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‘infinite’, in a sense, thereby avoiding a serious problem facing the dispositional account. 
The mysterious nature of our mental faculty accounts for our ability to grasp such a 
‘meaning’, which can supposedly determine how we are to use linguistic expressions in 
infinitely many cases. Furthermore, since these are objective entities that we grasp 
through a faculty, we can sense meanings in this higher ‘third realm’ in a similar way in 
which we sense the external world. We are given a picture of how this sixth sense might 
be able to pin down the meaning we seek.  
 Appealing to Frege in this manner only moves the problem about rule following 
to another level. How do we know when someone has ‘grasped’ the intended meaning? 
The rule “2n + (n-1)(n-2)(n-3)(n-4)” exists in Frege’s third realm too, and we need a way 
of establishing how to attribute meaning to a student whose mind is still grasping at 
straws. Kripke succinctly discusses this kind of Platonist route towards the end of his 
second chapter: 
 But the ultimate sceptical problem cannot be evaded, and it arises precisely in 
the question how the existence in my mind of any mental entity or idea can constitute 
‘grasping’ any particular sense rather than another. The idea in my mind is a finite object: 
can it not be interpreted as determining a quus function, rather than a plus function? Of 
course there may be another idea in my mind, which is supposed to constitute its act of 
assigning a particular interpretation to the first idea; but then the problem obviously 
arises again at this new level. (Kripke 1982, p. 54) 
 
While these meaning entities might be ‘infinite’, our minds certainly are not. So the 
question arises again: how do we determine that my mental act of grasping constitutes 
“2n” and not “2n + (n-1)(n-2)(n-3)(n-4)”? I have a finite idea in my mind that is supposed 
to correspond in some fashion to an objective meaning entity, but its finiteness allows for 
infinitely many possible meaning entities to be related to it. Essentially, Frege has to rely 
on a notion of private ostensive definition, which we will discuss at length at the end of 
this chapter. This dependence upon the workings of a private mental realm destroys any 
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advances a theory of meaning might have through an appeal to objective meaning 
entities. Frege was a brilliant thinker on his own, but this particular aspect of his thought 
cannot help us with our problem. 
 Russell’s response presents a greater challenge to Wittgenstein, but ultimately 
relies on an analogous conception of private ostensive definition. The essence of 
Russell’s stance lies in the fact that the meaning of an expression boils down to a 
sensation in the mind of the learner. In our example of “2n”, the student becomes directly 
acquainted with a sense-datum, a particular private experience, that constitutes the 
meaning of “2n”, presumably through familiar methods of training and repetition. This 
response does have some explanatory power and initial plausibility. We do seem to have 
some kind of sensation associated with those elementary epiphanies we had when 
learning arithmetic, and continue to have other sensations as we solve new puzzles, study 
new languages, or learn things in general. 
 Unfortunately, private sensations do not hold water as a helpful explanation for 
very long. In section 160, Wittgenstein discusses a similar problem with knowing when 
someone is ‘reading’: 
 But imagine the following case: We give someone who can read fluently a text 
that he never saw before. He reads it to us—but with the sensation of saying something 
he has learnt by heart (this might be the effect of some drug). Should we say in such a 
case that he was not really reading the passage? Should we here allow his sensations to 
count as the criterion for his reading or not reading? (PI, 160) 
 
Applying this criticism to our case, grant that we have an idea of what this sensation is, 
and further suppose that we (harmlessly) induce the sensation in a child who is learning 
arithmetic. We ask them to perform a simple sum, say “49 +21”, and the child shouts, 
“Oh I know how to do that! The answer is 72!” Are we to say that the student has learned 
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how to add or not? Despite having the sensation supposedly required for meaning 
addition, it is clear that the student does not understand how to add. 
 There are other simple considerations that make this response unappealing. If 
meaning is supposed to be this private mental sensation accompanying linguistic 
expressions, how are we to know that each of us means the same thing when we 
communicate?6 These sensations are in principle inaccessible to anyone else. An 
argument from analogy gets us a probabilistic certainty at best. Furthermore, the whole 
qualitative character of this sensation is enigmatic. Kripke illustrates this problem well: 
 Attend to what happened when I first learned to add. First, there may or may not 
have been a specifiable time, probably in my childhood, at which I suddenly felt 
(Eureka!) that I had grasped the rule for addition. If there was not, it is very hard to see in 
what the suppositious special experience of my learning to add consisted. Even if there 
was a particular time at which I could have shouted “Eureka!” – surely the exceptional 
case – in what did the attendant experience consist? Probably consideration of a few 
particular cases and thought – “Now I’ve got it!” – or the like. Could just this be the 
content of an experience of ‘meaning addition’? How would it have been different if I 
had meant quus? 7 (Kripke 1982, p. 44-5) 
 
What can we really say about this sensation? More importantly, how would it differ from 
the one we would get when we mean to follow “2n + (n-1)(n-2)(n-3)(n-4)”? There is not 
a readily perceivable way to distinguish between the two. And suppose that there were a 
way; when are we to say that this sensation came to us? When I wrote out the nth term in 
                                                 
6
 Evidently, there was a time when Russell did not find this objection problematic. Indeed, it seems that he 
thought that if we meant the same things by our words, we “…would be unable to tell people at home what 
you had seen in foreign parts [of the world].” (Russell , p. 56) He recognizes that no one has the same exact 
sense-data experience, and so, according to his theory, no one means the exact same things with their 
words. However, he thinks this is necessary for us to successfully communicate. Needless to say, I find the 
possibility that we might never mean the same things by our words extremely problematic. While Russell’s 
theory demands more attention, it is too tangential presently. In any case, his theory does not seem to meet 
Wittgenstein’s overarching challenges. 
7
 Kripke uses the word “quus” here to denote the function he introduces as “quaddition” in his argument. 
Unlike “addition”, “quaddition” is the arithmetical function that dictates: “For any pair of numbers x, y < 
57, perform usual addition to find their ‘quum’. If either x or y is equal to or over 57, respond with “5” for 
their quum.” This is just a different example of a rule to which all of our behaviors have conformed, similar 
to “2n for all n =< 4 and 5 for all n > 4” in our example. 
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the series? This response faces a host of perplexing questions and it does not seem to be 
equipped to deal with them. 
 These initial considerations are perhaps not fair enough to Russell and advocates 
of his assumption. There are two related objections to consider. The first argues that 
anyone can differentiate between the sensations of grasping the meaning of “2n” and 
grasping the meaning of “2n + (n-1)(n-2)(n-3)(n-4)”. These sensations are as different as 
the differences between the sensations of blue and red. The student has direct 
acquaintance and, moreover, infallible access to her sense-data, and so it does not seem 
possible that she might misidentify her sensation for an incorrect ones. The second 
concedes that there might not be an immediate sensation for “2n” with which we become 
directly acquainted, but that is because “2n” is a complex expression. The meanings of 
our simple symbols do lie in such an acquaintance. The meanings of “blue” and “red” lie 
in the familiar experience we all have with patches of blueness and redness. The 
meanings of more complex expressions, such as “2n”, are constructed out of these simple 
symbols and various logical relations that obtain between them. 
 These responses bring us to some crucial points of the rule-following 
considerations. Concerning the first, we are left with at least two substantial problems 
even if we grant the student infallible access to her sensations. Firstly, since our 
sensations are finite, it is not clear how the experience of “2, 4, 6, 8 …” is supposed to 
manifest the ‘sensation’ “2n” rather than “2n + (n-1)(n-2)(n-3)(n-4)”. If we consider the 
series “2n”, we see that we can only experience a finite segment of the series. Presumably 
after some finite term in the series, we privately ostensively define the meaning of “2n”. 
But what quality of our sensation determines that we now mean “2n” and not “2n + (n-
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1)(n-2)(n-3)(n-4)”? We only experience seeing the numbers “2, 4, 6, 8, …”, and so 
claiming that this experience gives us a sensation of “2n” rather than “2n + (n-1)(n-2)(n-
3)(n-4)” gives an unjustified preference for the former over the latter. In this respect, this 
case is not like the cases of blue and red, for our sensations are equivalent.8  
 Regarding the second objection, restricting our considerations to cases of blue and 
red does not dodge our difficulties. There are at least two strong objections facing this 
move. We can concede that there is a fundamental difference between the sensations of 
red and blue. However, a worry arises even when we consider the nature of the basic 
sensation of red closely. What, exactly, is the sensation of red? Does it have a particular 
shape, say a square, or is it irregularly shaped? 
 Ask yourself: what shape must the sample of the colour green be? Should it be 
rectangular? Or would it then be the sample of a green rectangle? – Should it be 
‘irregular’ in shape? And what is to prevent us then from regarding it – that is, from using 
it – only as a sample of irregularity of shape? (PI, 73) 
 
Why do we not take our particular sensation of red to mean “red squares” or “irregular 
shapes”? Any particular sensation we have is not sufficient for establishing the meaning 
of “red” because the sensation could be interpreted to stand for various words with 
dramatically different meanings.9 
                                                 
8
 Appealing to radical empiricism will not help in this case either. Let us grant the plausibility that we 
actually experience relations between objects and, less controversially, that we experience their qualities. 
The question still remains: what is it about viewing this finite segment of the series that gives you the actual 
sensation of “2n” and not “2n + (n-1)(n-2)(n-3)(n-4)”? I might be able to perceive the relation “x is taller 
than y”, but I do not perceive the infinitely many numbers of this series and any pattern or relationship 
between the ones I do see could be interpreted under either rule. It is not clear how we could demonstrate 
how one rule manifests itself to our senses over the other without begging the question. 
9
 The problem above leaves us with a problem concerning the indeterminacy of private ostensive definition. 
Our particular sensations cannot determine the precise meaning we are after. A similar point is made 
against referentialism in The Blue Book with Wittgenstein’s example of the word “tove”. (BB, p. 2) 
Referentialism holds that the meanings of words are the particular external objects for which they stand. 
The “tove” example is supposed to establish a fatal indeterminacy of reference plaguing this account as 
well. Translating his example to our present case, it is unclear how we could definitively ostensively refer 
to the color red, or at least we cannot be sure that another picks out the object we intend them to. The color 
red inheres in various objects, and so it appears impossible to definitively ostensively point to the color red 
and not books, tables, shapes, quantities, and so on. 
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 Now let us suppose that the objection above fails somehow, so we grant that we 
have access to the sensation presumably required for successful private ostensive 
definition.10 Despite this concession, the meaning of “red” is surely not exhausted by this 
particular sense-impression of redness. The meaning of “red” has a certain generality and 
limitless applicability that goes beyond any immediate sense impression you might have. 
This requires a method by which we can determine correct uses of the newly defined 
word in the future. The most natural attempt to formulate such a method relies on 
appealing to past sensations. When I see a new patch of color, I know whether or not this 
color is “red” that I privately defined it in the past because it either is or is not the same 
color I previously had.  Since we know what our sensations are and are allowed to 
distinguish between them coherently, picking out the same one on any given instance 
should not be a problem.  
 Even with coherent access to sensations, it looks like this account will fail. 
Consider being presented with a patch the color we call ‘red’ and how we might privately 
ostensively define a meaning corresponding to it.  
 A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. – Well, that is done 
precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the 
connexion between the sign and the sensation. – But “I impress it on myself” can only 
mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But 
in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is 
going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about 
‘right’. (PI, 258) 
 
The first problem with private ostensive definition is that we have no criterion of 
correctness. Whatever sensations we have in the future will mean “red” because we 
choose them to. But the problem with a private language extends beyond this resulting 
                                                 
10
 We should reconsider Frege’s position as well at this point, because the arguments below apply perfectly 
analogously to the supposed idea in our minds that determines an objective meaning entity. Frege relied 
just as heavily on the notion of private ostensive definition as Russell did; they just thought ‘meanings’ 
were different kinds of entities. 
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relativism about meaning. There is actually no way for us to follow our own “private 
rules” because we are simply using the words whimsically. This gives us a horrible 
problem of indeterminacy of meaning: we do not even know what the correct use of any 
word is. 
 Still, we might want to appeal to some ability to ‘subjectively justify’ the uses of 
our words. Surely we know the procedure we use to determine what word to call a given 
sensation: this consists in comparing the given sensation against our previous ones.  We 
establish a method of comparison (i.e. a private rule that we follow) and then apply the 
method in future uses. 
 There are a number of problems with ‘subjective justification’. Firstly, the method 
by which we compare previous sensations to our current ones lacks a criterion of 
correctness as well. For example, if we were to try to justify our use of the word “red” 
upon perceiving a certain color, we might try to appeal to whether or not this sensation is 
“the same” as the past sensation we used to privately ostensively define a word. 
However, determining whether or not this sensation is “the same” as our past sensation is 
completely up to us. We are not “following a rule” in any sense because there are no 
constraints on future “correct” uses of a word: 
 Don’t always think that you read off what you say from the facts; that you 
portray these in words according to rules. For even so you would have to apply the rule in 
the particular case without guidance. (PI, 292) 
 
It is clear that we might postulate some second order rule governing the application of 
another rule, but our worries simply arise again at this level. Appealing to higher order 
rules only results in an infinite regress of rules where the problem repeats itself at each 
new level. 
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 All of the above considerations constitute what I call Wittgenstein’s negative 
private language argument. Appealing to a notion of private ostensive definition cannot 
determine the meanings of our words. We are left with a large mess about rules in the 
wake of this conclusion, but we have been working towards this for a purpose. We all 
have a deeply rooted picture that our language is governed by grammatical rules, and this 
idea extends beyond the concept of grammar that we all have from primary school. There 
are generally supposed to be particular constraints on the correct application of words, 
“Green”, “Table”, “And”, and all of the other words in our language. If a child calls 
something that is red “Green”, we chide them and realize they have not learned the rules 
governing the word “Green”. Similar things happen for all of our words, but the 
considerations above cast doubt upon our natural conceptions of language acquisition. 
One cannot construct a meaningful private language in the manner considered above, or 
at least one that relies on these Fregean or Russellian notions of private ostensive 
definition and rule-following. Furthermore, we see the devastating affects resulting from 
adopting the traditional assumption about meaning (TA). Both Russell and Frege endorse 
TA, and they run into dramatic problems when they try to establish how meanings can be 
brought together with our uses of linguistic expressions.  
 However, our language is clearly meaningful. I take this as a brute fact and I do 
not see anyway of denying this statement without being falling into a bizarre realm of 
problems and incoherencies. If our entire language is not meaningful, what does that 
thesis really assert? It is supposedly trying to tell us something… but it cannot? The 
thesis is not even straightforwardly self-contradictory because all contradictions are at 
least meaningful. We can understand what contradictions say, even though their logical 
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form makes them false necessarily. This thesis cannot even get off the ground. Therefore, 
we must reject it for failing to tell us anything at all. With that settled, we can begin to 
describe how language is actually meaningful. 
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Chapter Two: 
Uprooting Old Assumptions and Planting New Meaning 
 This chapter will sketch a picture of how our language can still be meaningful 
without the traditional assumption about meaning (TA) criticized in chapter one, 
respecting Wittgenstein’s stubborn refusal to give a definite theory about meaning. While 
this rough picture is intended to avoid all of the problems Wittgenstein raises about TA, I 
present it in a somewhat infantile stage. My only purpose in doing so is to present a new 
way of looking at meaning that could be developed further elsewhere and does not face 
any immediate problems about rule-following. I do not intend to profess the infallibility 
of this picture, but merely that it is a tenable alternative. The rest of this essay should be 
read as a meditation on how this alternative, if it can bear fruit, could help us address the 
problem of other minds, solipsism, and ultimately the self. To this end, I am indebted to 
Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, John McDowell, P.M.S. Hacker, and G.P. Baker for their 
elucidating secondary commentary, and my debt will be acknowledged when necessary. 
 Before discussing his rejection of TA, I will clarify how Wittgenstein avoids the 
familiar labels within contemporary metaphysics of Realist or Anti-realist.11 This will 
give us a deeper appreciation for how we can maintain a coherent philosophical position 
despite rejecting a seemingly necessary assumption. The next section elucidates the role 
of meaning in our most primitive language games, and the final section discusses a 
possible way in which our current languages can be seen as various extensions of this 
                                                 
11
 Broadly speaking, a Realist stance holds that there is a readymade objective or mind independent world 
that we have direct access to via our language and thought. Anti-realism claims that we do not have access 
to reality as it is in itself, as it is objectively. Instead, we only have access to experience tainted by the 
permeated presence of our thought or language, depending on the brand of Anti-realism one advocates.  
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primitive language without reducing our more complex meanings merely to those found 
in our primitive language. 
 
I. A Revolutionary Rejection 
 At first it seems that Wittgenstein, in the spectrum of theories between Realism 
and Anti-realism, holds a form of Anti-realism, while his exact place in the continuum 
may be arguable. Here are a few quick quotes that support this Anti-realist reading: 
 Essence is expressed by grammar. (PI, 371) 
 
 The proof doesn’t explore the essence of the two figures, but it does express 
what I am going to count as belonging to the essence of the figures from now on. – I 
deposit what belongs to the essence among the paradigms of language.  
 The mathematician creates essences. (RFM, 32) 
 
 Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (PI, 373) 
 
 How do I know that this colour is red? – It would be an answer to say: “I have 
learnt English”. (PI, 381) 
 
These maxims smack of Anti-realism. We can only conceive of the essences of things 
through our language. There are no ‘kinds of objects’ that exist independent of our 
grammar. Answers to classic metaphysical problems about properties dissolve simply by 
understanding the English language. Aside from these specific quotes, Wittgenstein’s 
notion of language games is thoroughly Anti-realistic. None of our language games 
depict or correspond with “Reality” in any sense. All we have are various games that are 
not even ‘true’ in any metaphysically superlative sense. When we try to ask philosophical 
questions about the nature of reality, we only bump into the limits of our language and 
end up asking meaningless questions – making illegitimate moves in our language games.  
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 Despite these strands in Wittgenstein’s thought that scream of Anti-realism, there 
are several passages that seem to indicate sympathy towards a Realist view. Here are a 
few: 
 (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): “The general form of a proposition is: 
This is how things are.” – That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself 
countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing’s nature over and 
over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it. (PI, 
114, emphasis added) 
 
 The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their 
simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always 
before one’s eyes.) […] And this means: we fail to be struck by what , once seen, is most 
striking and most powerful. (PI, 129) 
 
These passages retain the elements of Anti-realism expressed above. However, they have 
a remotely Kantian flavor, and even seem to hearken back to the infamous seventh 
proposition of the Tractatus: “What we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence.” 
Wittgenstein certainly rejects all talk about ‘things-in-themselves’ as non-sense, but here 
he is not saying that we cannot know things as they really are. Rather, he seems to 
advocate what might be called a quietist Realism. I believe that Charles Sanders Peirce 
hints at a helpful version of this position in his article “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”:  
 But it may be said that this view is directly opposed to the abstract definition 
which we have given of reality, inasmuch as it makes the characters of the real depend on 
what is ultimately thought about them. But the answer to this is that, on the one hand, 
reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but only of what you or I or 
any finite number of men may think about it; and that, on the other hand, though the 
object of the final opinion depends on what that opinion is, yet what that opinion is does 
not depend on what you or I or any man thinks. (Peirce 1995, p. 38-9) 
 
I quote Peirce with caution, because Wittgenstein certainly has many points of 
disagreement with him. Peirce’s deference to the scientific method, his theory of signs, 
and his overall commitment to a more robust scientific Realism are fairly un-
Wittgensteinian. Let us therefore confine ourselves to this quote alone: we see that 
ultimately the objects of our opinions are determined by what opinions we have (i.e. 
Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is), and so, when we try to say anything, 
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we fall short of describing reality “as it is in itself.” On the other hand, there is an 
independent reality, and it forces itself upon us in ways that constrain our ability to 
arbitrarily create meaningful language solely on the basis of our subjective whims. From 
Wittgenstein’s angle, the reality Peirce speaks of is what is most familiar to us because it 
is always in front of us. While we can trace and retrace our frame, we are always looking 
at something, but whenever we try to get outside of our language to talk about it we fall 
into metaphysical non-sense.  
 Both of these readings have their merits, but ultimately I think Wittgenstein 
would reject the label of either Realist or Anti-realist. Hilary Putnam endorses this 
reading of Wittgenstein as well, and brings out helpful distinctions between Wittgenstein 
and Kant:  
 For Wittgenstein, the negation of a pseudo-proposition is a pseudo-proposition; 
the negation of nonsense is nonsense. If we are persuaded that it is unintelligible to say 
“We sometimes succeed in describing reality as it is in itself”, then we should realize that 
it is equally unintelligible to say “We never succeed in describing reality as it is in itself”, 
[…] In fact, one might say that it is characteristic of Wittgenstein to try to show us that 
when philosophers say that we can’t do something, say that something is impossible, 
typically the thing that they tell us it is impossible to do is a nonsense thing, an 
unintelligible thing; that the philosopher, as it were, seems to be telling us of an 
Impotence, in the way the physicist tells us of an Impotence when he says “You can’t 
build a perpetual motion machine” or of a barrier we can’t cross, but it turns out on 
examination that the barrier is a mirage, or even less than a mirage – that it is chimerical. 
We can learn and change and invent languages, and in them we can state truths; that is 
describing reality. If you say, “Yes, but it is not describing reality as it is in itself”, you 
are saying nothing. (Putnam 1992, p. 39-40) 
 
Wittgenstein does not accept Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena 
because all talk of noumena is vacuous – it is not a meaningful move in our language 
game. However, this does not commit us to any typical brand of Anti-realism. 
Traditionally, Anti-realists want to say that our language or thought gets between us and 
‘reality’, and that we can never truly grasp things as they really are. But this thesis is just 
as nonsensical as saying we can describe reality as it is in itself. As Wittgenstein might 
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say, the negation of a pseudo-thesis is a pseudo-thesis, and so Anti-realism should be 
abandoned just as readily as Realism.  
 Some might find this move perplexing because they believe that Realist and Anti-
realist positions exhaust all possible positions that one can hold. This belief relies on the 
notion that language and reality are separate from each other and therefore require some 
kind of medium or bridge to bring them into harmony together. Of course, this is a 
fundamental assumption that both Realists and Anti-realists share, but it is not altogether 
clear that we must be committed to it. In their book, “Scepticism, Rules, and Language”, 
G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker state the problematic assumption thusly:  
 How then is language connected to reality? The question continues stubbornly to 
bewilder us. And when Wittgenstein answers bluntly: ‘There is no connection between 
language and reality’, we react with astonishment. […] The ground is cut out from under 
these deep philosophical misunderstandings […] once it is recognized that they are not 
viable in the light of Wittgenstein’s repudiation of the conception of language and reality 
as two discrete, self-contained realms of being. If the gulf between language and reality is 
illusory, then of course no bridge can span it. The statement that there is no connection 
between language and reality is not the affirmation of an antithesis to the thesis that they 
are connected by some mysterious mental or metaphysical bridging apparatus. It is rather 
a denial that there is room for any connection, for there is no gulf to span. The question 
‘How is language connected to reality?’ is what is amiss. For it rests firmly on a 
misconceived picture. (Baker and Hacker 1984, p. 134-6) 
 
But what are we left with if we accept that this traditional assumption is misleading? To 
answer this question adequately, we must first reevaluate our conception of meaning and 
rules. To do this, I will restate the traditional positions that I take Wittgenstein to be 
attacking in his rule-following considerations, and then sketch the reorientation we must 
do to see things aright. 
 The discussions in chapter one attack what I called the traditional assumption 
about meaning (TA). I take this position to hold that there are two separate and discrete 
entities involved when learning the meaning of our words: the uses of symbols (and the 
symbols themselves) and the ‘meaning’ that we attach to them. This is a natural 
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assumption prevalent within the philosophy of language, and indeed it seems to be 
something that is plausible before deep philosophical reflection. Anyone can make 
symbols: we draw things in the sand, sketch meaningless doodles out of boredom in our 
notebooks, and put to paper various other characters that have no meaning within our 
language. But the words in our language do have meaning, and presumably 
understanding this meaning requires that we ‘grasp’ the correct rules that normatively 
guide us in the future uses of our words. In order to communicate successfully, we must 
all come to the same understanding of the meaning of our words, and this is done in 
virtue of the fact that we have all grasped the same rules governing our language. Doing 
so transforms the dead symbols we produce into bearers of meaning that can be used for 
communication. 
 Wittgenstein explicitly rejects this picture. Indeed, a great deal of the PI raises 
deep problems for this picture, which chapter one summarizes. While I am not concerned 
with defending Kripke’s well-known interpretation of Wittgenstein, I feel that Kripke has 
been attacked unnecessarily for labeling these problems as ‘sceptical’ problems. This 
label is innocuous, for Kripke only intends to point out that Wittgenstein thinks there are 
deep problems with traditional conceptions of meaning. This is one aspect of his 
interpretation that I feel safe in endorsing, primarily because it seems univocally agreed 
upon, appearances notwithstanding.  While I do not accept Kripke’s ultimate solution, it 
is not clear that his initial approach to the solution dramatically diverges from 
Wittgenstein’s intentions: 
 … his [Wittgenstein’s] solution to his own sceptical problem begins by agreeing 
with the sceptics that there is no ‘superlative fact’ (S 192) about my mind that constitutes 
my meaning addition by ‘plus’ and determines in advance what I should do to accord 
with this meaning. […] A sceptical solution of a sceptical philosophical problem begins 
on the contrary by conceding that the sceptic’s negative assertions are unanswerable. 
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Nevertheless our ordinary practice or belief in justified because – contrary appearances 
notwithstanding – it need not require the justification the sceptic has show to be 
untenable. (Kripke 1982, p. 65-6, my emphasis) 
 
 It is certainly true that Wittgenstein does not think that there is any fact about my mind 
that determines what rule I am following, and moreover he thinks that there is no way to 
answer the problems he raises for TA. Instead, we simply need to realize that we do not 
need what the sceptic has shown to be impossible; we can reject the assumptions that 
brought us to these problems in the first place. The move Wittgenstein makes is similar to 
his move within the debate in metaphysics between Realists and Anti-realists: we do not 
need to accept the fundamental premise that both sides share. Unlike where we left off 
with that debate, Wittgenstein paints us a more substantive picture here, which I will now 
explicate. 
 
II. Primitive “Language” and Thought Experiments 
 The best initial approach to this picture begins with a thought experiment. 
Imagine a group of people millions of years ago who have not yet developed any sort of 
linguistic practices remotely similar to our own. The only modes of communication they 
have recourse to are grunts, crying, screams, playful or suggestive gestures, and other 
familiar things of this nature. I am not a student of linguistics or anthropology, but it 
seems safe to say that these kinds of things were present before humans developed the 
beginnings of what we call “language” today. What are we to make of these gestures? It 
is immediately clear that they are all kinds of actions, and they serve a definite role in the 
community. Without the ability to scream, it becomes difficult to warn the group of 
danger. Without the ability to make eye contact with a male or female in a certain way, 
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the courting process becomes difficult and filled with ambiguity. Without the ability to 
cry, members lose the ability to draw attention to themselves when they are in distress. 
 Furthermore, there does not have to be a regular connection between the sounds 
that these people make and their actions. This can happen in two ways: (1) the same 
sounds can be used for different meanings and (2) different sounds can have the same 
meaning. Regarding (1), screaming, grunting, etc, serve multiple purposes that vary 
depending on the situation in which they occur. For example, grunting can be used to 
stop some one from annoying you, when pushing people out of the way, or a number of 
other things. The exact same sound could be uttered on each instance, while their 
meaning differs.  
 Conversely, different sounds could be used for the same function. Imagine the 
following scenario within this community. A dead animal has just been brought back 
from a hunting expedition and the group has finished preparing the meat. It has been a 
while since any of them have eaten and, since the group is fairly large, a crowd forms 
around the prepared food, with the members pushing and shoving each other to get their 
own piece. On the outskirts of this scene is a particularly hungry male, who initially tries 
to “grunt” his way to the food. No holes open up, and after a while the male starts 
screaming. These screams have the same meaning as the grunts, although they are more 
effective due to their increased volume. I do not intend to mean that the male gets 
annoyed or some such thing because of his peers’ unresponsiveness; that would cause the 
meanings of the scream and the grunt to diverge. The thought experiment supposes that 
he does not get annoyed, merely persisting in his request to partake in the meal in both 
cases. He does not want to convey some newly spawned frustration; he just wants to eat. 
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 We can conclude from these thought experiments that there does not have to be a 
regular connection between the sounds and gestures of the primitive group and their 
actions. Wittgenstein gives another important thought experiment to illustrate this point: 
 Let us imagine that the people in that country carried on the usual human 
activities and in the course of them employed, apparently, an articulate language. If we 
watch their behavior we find it intelligible, it seems ‘logical’. But when we try to learn 
their language we find it impossible to do so. For there is no regular connexion between 
what they say, the sounds they make, and their actions; but still these sounds are not 
superfluous, for if we gag one of the people, it has the same consequences as with us; 
without the sounds their actions fall into confusion – as I feel like putting it. (PI, 207, my 
emphasis) 
 
The society Wittgenstein considers is not exactly the same as the primitive group we have 
been considering, but there are crucial similarities between them. In both, various sounds 
can be used meaningfully for various activities. The gagging statement is best understood 
in reference to the primitive group of people. Imagine gagging one of the members in the 
primitive group. This member loses the ability to grunt, scream, or make any kind of 
sounds that she might use to communicate. In this way, the member becomes unable to 
function normally in the group; her actions become confusing to her peers without the 
ability to make these sounds.  
 I find thinking about a primitive society fruitful for many reasons. Firstly, we 
acquire a better understanding of how we can reject the traditional separation between 
words and meaning that underlies TA. Since there are no clear regularities to speak of, 
we can see how these gestures are completely meaningful despite their inability to 
conform to any set of ‘rules’.  For each sound of this primitive language, the meaning of 
the expression is completely bound up with both the action of the speaker and her 
surroundings. This is why you cannot coherently separate the meaning of an expression 
from the instance of the expression itself. Wittgenstein has several passages that help 
flesh out this account: 
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 When I think in language, there aren’t ‘meanings’ going through my mind in 
addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought. (PI, 329) 
 
 We say, for instance, to someone who uses a sign unknown to us: “If by ‘x!2’ 
you mean x^2, then you get this value for y, if you mean 2x, that one.” – Now ask 
yourself: how does one mean the one thing or the other by “x!2”?  
 That will be how meaning it can determine the steps in advance. (PI, 190) 
 
 It strikes us as if something else, something over and above the use of the word 
“all”, must have changed if ‘fa’ is no longer to follow from ‘(x).fx’; something attaching 
to the word itself. 
 Isn’t this like saying: “If this man were to act differently, his character would 
have to be different”. Now this may mean something in some cases and not in others. We 
say “behavior flows from character” and that is how use flows from meaning. (RFM, 13) 
 
PI 329 directly expresses Wittgenstein’s rejection of TA. Verbal expressions cannot be 
separated from their meaning. PI 190 leaves us with a question, whose answer is that we 
need to do something in order to ‘mean’ anything by “x!2”.12 You have to start giving 
demonstrations of correct applications of “x!2” in order to show its meaning. The passage 
from RFM rejects TA again, and follows this with a helpful metaphor. Here is a useful 
example that blends the comparison. Imagine meeting a husband who tells you: “I love 
my wife.” This statement tells us two things relative to our investigation: it is a claim 
about his character and it is a meaningful use of the verb ‘to love’. Suppose further that 
we observe this man in his interactions with his wife and find out that he continually 
neglects her, ignores her concerns, and beats her. There is an obvious initial response we 
would give to such observations. We would say that his character has changed; he is no 
longer a man with the loving character that we thought he had. But what do we say if he 
sincerely insists that he loves his wife? The use of his expression and the conditions 
surrounding it change the meaning of the word. He does not mean the same thing that we 
                                                 
12
 The following examples rely on an intuitive notion of ‘rules’ for the time being. A more thorough 
description of the role rules play in our language is given below. These examples are simply meant to 
develop a preliminary understanding of Wittgenstein’s picture. 
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do by the verb ‘to love’. This serves as a good initial demonstration of the relationship 
between meaning and use. 
 With these examples in mind, we can address the problem of rule-following more 
thoroughly. Turning back to the primitive group, Wittgenstein’s interlocutor might want 
to protest, as she does elsewhere, “You take the easy way out! You have not told us what 
justifies the use of these screams and these cries of joy in the primitive group. Why 
should we accept these uses of these noises and gestures as correct moves in the 
primitive language game?” Indeed, Wittgenstein does initially seem to take an easy route 
when he says: 
 What we have rather to do is to accept the everyday language-game, and to note 
false accounts of the matter as false. The primitive language-game which children are 
taught needs no justification; attempts at justification need to be rejected. (PI, p. 200) 
 
This terse response might seem inadequate because it forces us to accept some kind of 
brute facts regarding the meaning of our primitive modes of communication. However, 
the better response to these questions points out that the attempt to justify our primitive 
language implicitly adopts TA, which we have already rejected. Another thought 
experiment will help show where the questioner went wrong.  
 Suppose I am at a train station and someone starts screaming, falling to the floor 
writhing in pain. I immediately run over to ascertain the scenario. There is no hesitation 
or doubt in my mind about what is happening. The first thing to notice is that I do not 
need any training to react in the way I do.13 No kind of teaching is necessary for being 
able to respond to such primitive sounds and gestures. We can see this in infants too. 
                                                 
13
 In the quote above, Wittgenstein says that the primitive language game that children are taught 
needs no justification. The games I take Wittgenstein to have in mind include some of the most basic 
forms of, for example, the English language, such as object recognition, simple counting games, and so 
on. However, I do not consider these games to be the most basic language games we use, and while we 
have not yet considered these more complicated examples, I think that Wittgenstein’s responses are 
even stronger for a fundamental language game that does not require teaching. 
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Scream at an infant and it cries. Lovingly hold it and laugh with it and it smiles back. 
There is something fundamental about these sounds. They incite instinctual reactions in 
all humans (and other animals as well) at all ages, and we do not need them to be taught 
to us.  
 With this in mind, we can address the question raised by the interlocutor. Why are 
we justified in responding the way we do? How is the correct response determined? 
These questions implicitly assume that there is a clear distinction between a rule that 
dictates what we have to do and the actual actions that are either in accord or conflict 
with the rule. Only by accepting this dichotomy do we fall into all of the problems 
discussed in chapter one. But our rejection of this assumption does not leave us in the 
dark. We have a natural and perhaps surprisingly intuitive picture before us when we 
think about primitive language, where the actions and surrounding circumstances are 
entirely bound up with meaning. Furthermore, since there is no uniformly regular 
connection between the sounds the primitive people make and their actions, it becomes 
incoherent even within the traditional framework to separate the rule from its 
corresponding action. This forces us to revise our conception of the nature of a ‘rule’. 
Rules were deemed necessary for normatively determining the meaning of an expression, 
but we have been forced to reject the idea that rules are generalized theoretical 
abstractions from their instantiations that we somehow ‘grasp’ with our minds. However, 
meaning is completely determinate in this fundamental primitive language, and this is 
done without the need for rigid ‘rules’ governing the game. Understanding the meaning 
of an action in these primitive cases does not depend on pinning down some 
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interpretation of a rule or recognizing any regularity between the current instance of the 
rule and our past experiences of different actions and rules.  
 Wittgenstein challenges us, in PI 303, “Just try – in a real case – to doubt 
someone else’s fear or pain”, but this is not a typical bet. Usually, bets can fall either 
way. Here Wittgenstein suggests that it is impossible to doubt someone’s pain in a real 
case. This challenge is not a simple expression of the ‘extreme likelihood’ that someone 
else is in pain in a ‘real’ case; it is rather a novel act of defiance against the traditional 
distinction between action and meaning. We cannot coherently ask how this action 
‘accords’ with this rule because the meaningfulness of the act and the act itself are tied 
together so thoroughly that you cannot coherently ask about one in separation from the 
other. Therefore, we are given no real room for doubt, for doubt can only exist where a 
possibility of error exists. In these cases, there is no room for error because of a two-fold 
mutual dependence. On the one hand, the action is the sole conveyor of the meaning, 
while on the other hand we would have an entirely different action if the meaning altered.  
 So where does this leave us with the issue of normativity? The whole idea of 
justifying our actions in this primitive language has not been given a clear sense because 
of the mutual dependence between meaning and action in these cases. Actions cannot be 
brought into accordance with a rule because they are inextricably bound together. This 
negative response is only one side of the story. The positive response tells us that this 
primitive language is one with which we are instinctually familiar. Consequently, we 
never make false moves in this language-game because the meaning of the gestures and 
sounds within it are clear to us on a deep intuitive level. Our primitive language needs no 
‘justification’ because our ability to play it cannot coherently be called into question.  
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III. Extending Our Results 
 These meditations may have established a plausible account of our primitive 
language, but we have mastered a much more intricate extension of this language, which 
has presumably developed throughout our evolutionary history. Wittgenstein explicitly 
suggests that this kind of development is the case:  
 Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so 
many natural, instinctive, kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our 
language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-
game is an extension of primitive behaviour. (For our language-game is behaviour.) 
(Instinct). (Z, 545) 
 
It still remains to be seen how this ‘extension’ is possible. Wittgenstein emphasizes the 
need for training and regularity to establish what we call ‘language’ today. For example, 
Wittgenstein ends PI 207, the section about gagging a member of a community whose 
sounds were not regularly connected with their actions, by saying, “Are we to say that 
these people have a language: orders, reports, and the rest? There is not enough regularity 
for us to call it ‘language.’” Of course, appealing to the concept of ‘regularity’ seems 
problematic at first, because we largely avoided it when describing our primitive 
language. Wittgenstein is aware of this, and follows PI 207 with a response: 
 Then am I defining “order” and “rule” by means of “regularity”? – How do I 
explain the meaning of “regular”, “uniform”, “same” to anyone? – I shall explain these 
words to someone who, say, only speaks French by means of the corresponding French 
words. But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall teach him to use the words by 
means of examples and by practice. – And when I do this I do not communicate less to 
him than I know myself. 
 In the course of this teaching I shall shew him the same colours, the same 
lengths, the same shapes, I shall make him find them and produce them, and so on. I 
shall, for instance, get him to continue an ornamental pattern uniformly when told to do 
so. – And also to continue progressions. And so, for example, when given: . .. … to go 
on: …. ….. …… . 
 I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by expressions of agreement, 
rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his way, or hold him back; and so on. 
 Imagine witnessing such teaching. None of the words would be explained by 
means of itself; there would be no logical circle. (PI, 208) 
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The first two paragraphs are initially confusing. Wittgenstein seems to be alluding to the 
techniques that he criticized elsewhere in the PI, but these were criticized in the context 
of critiquing TA. We should not think that this kind of teaching allows the student to 
grasp the rule by some private mental operation of their minds – in either a Russellian or 
Fregean way or through developing ‘dispositions’. The last two paragraphs indicate a 
vital change in direction. The teacher influences the student using primitive expressions, 
such as rejection, agreement, expectation, and others. These expressions are already 
meaningful for the student, and they are able to use them as a solid foundation for their 
learning. This avoids problems about logical circularity because we have taken the 
meaningfulness of our primitive language as a brute fact. Now, for example, if we 
consider the student learning the series of even integers, her teacher gives her a number 
of examples, lets her try to continue, and then either expresses encouragement or 
rejection. These reactions are the kinds of primitive behavior that the child understands 
already, and so progress can be made during the child’s training.  
 A natural question arises at this point, because it is not as clear how these actions 
and the meaning the teacher is trying to convey are inextricably bound together. How can 
any number of these primitive ‘meaning-actions’ give rise to the kind of meaning we 
desire when speaking the language game of mathematics? We are trying to teach the 
student the meaning of the expression “2n”, which is presumably different from any of 
the primitive gestures we have been discussing, but how is this done?  
 The answer to this question lies in a more thorough discussion about the 
relationship between rules and meaning. We need to make a careful distinction between 
what we call “rules” and the meaningfulness of particular actions. In our vastly 
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complicated language game of English, we call things like “2n”, or various other 
grammatical rules, “rules”, and it is precisely this aspect of our language that beguiled us 
into adopting TA. We have to follow, or ‘be in accordance with’, a rule for our actions to 
be meaningful – how this is established is another matter. Here the rule, there the action, 
and the particular relationship between them will determine the meaningfulness of the 
act. But this is exactly the kind of picture we must reject, on the pain of facing the 
devastating problems raised in the first chapter. Rather, the things we call rules are 
linguistic expressions that serve as what Wittgenstein calls ‘sign-posts’ for us. They are 
also the things we use to ‘justify’ our behavior, which brings us to the vital distinction 
between meaningful actions and rules: 
 “But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, 
on some interpretation, in accord with the rule.” – That is not what we ought to say, but 
rather: any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot 
give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning. 
 “Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?” – Let me ask 
this: what has the expression of a rule – say a sign-post – got to do with my actions? 
What sort of connexion is there here? – Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to 
react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. 
 But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we 
now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the 
contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there 
exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom. (PI, 198) 
 
The interlocutor in this passage assumes the traditional distinction between meaning and 
action that we have rejected. There is no such ‘act of accordance’ between an action and 
a rule; indeed this model loses all explanatory power when its logic is followed through:  
 This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, 
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: 
if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to 
conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. 
 It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the 
course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented 
us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this 
shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is 
exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases. (PI, 
201) 
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Much needs to be said to elucidate these infamous passages, but they are an ideal starting 
point for sketching a picture of how we “obey a rule” and “go against one” in particular 
scenarios. A more robust account of this position requires the further discussion of the 
role of ‘training’ and ‘custom’. 
 There are at least two things needed for the acquisition of language: practice 
through training and an existing custom within a community that serves as a background 
for this teaching. We will first consider the role of training, but we should contrast 
training with our primitive community to emphasize the differences in the scenarios. 
Compare the classroom setting to that of the primitive group we have been considering. 
In the primitive group, the actions of its members are fairly loose, I want to say. Each 
member interacts with the others in various ways: playing, fighting, eating, mating, 
walking, and searching, all the time interacting with whom they please. There is no 
emphasis placed on the repetition of certain sounds in certain scenarios because all of 
their interactions are, for the most part, haphazard. The group takes life as it comes to 
them, dealing with problems as they arise without giving attention to regulating the 
sounds they happen to make to each other. There is certainly no such thing as ‘training’ 
present in any of the groups activities, and, as we have seen, it is precisely only in action 
that meaning can take hold. 
 We witness very different activities in the classroom. We can see that there is 
much more going on here than mere primitive gestures would allow. While there are 
elements of the primitive language present in these teachings, the focus on repetition and 
the way old words are put together into new explanations introduce foreign situations to 
the students. Using these techniques of repetition and examples, the teacher forces a new 
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kind of activity upon the students. The teacher uses the series in front of the students, all 
the while offering explanations to supplement these uses. These rigid techniques are alien 
to the loose environment of the primitive community. However, the students are not left 
in the dark because the expressions of encouragement, rejection, and others that the 
students understand are constantly employed by the teacher to lead them into novel 
settings. In this way, the teacher demonstrates meaning by acting,  
      Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? – In use it is alive. Is life breathed 
into it there? – Or is the use its life? (PI, 432)  
 
      “Everything is already there in ….” How does it come about that this arrow  
points? Doesn’t it seem to carry in it something besides itself? – “No, not the dead line on 
paper; only the psychical thing, the meaning, can do that.” – That is both true and false. 
The arrow points only in the applications that a living being makes of it. 
      The pointing is not a hocus-pocus which can be performed only by the soul. (PI, 454)  
 
      Yes: meaning something is like going up to someone. (PI, 457)  
 
It is in the application of the series that meaning gets its hold. PI 457 describes this in a 
brief metaphor as ‘going up’ to the students. The action is right in front of the students, 
and so the meaning is too. The teacher culminates her lesson by showing the students 
what we call ‘a rule’, which essentially serves as a sophisticated gesture that functions as 
a ‘sign-post’ for the students. 
 We can do more to clarify this picture. During the course of her teaching, we see 
that the teacher entirely exhausts what she knows when all of her examples and 
explanations run out. Wittgenstein has several quotes endorsing this idea: 
 What does it mean to know what a game is? Isn’t my knowledge, my concept of 
a game, completely expressed in the explanations that I could give? That is, in my 
describing examples of various kinds of game; shewing how all sorts of other games can 
be constructed on the analogy of these; saying that I should scarcely include this or this 
among games; and so on. (PI, 75)  
 
 “But do you really explain to the other person what you yourself understand? 
Don’t you get him to guess the essential thing? You give him examples, – but he has to 
guess their drift, to guess your intention.” – Every explanation which I can give myself I 
give to him too. – “He guesses what I intend” would mean: various interpretations of my 
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explanation come to his mind, and he lights on one of them. So in this case he could ask; 
and I could and should answer him. (PI, 210) 
 
The teacher leads her students by means of initially simple examples, namely the 
beginning of the series, gives some kind of explanations of the form, “And now repeat 
the same procedure at each step”, gives examples of false moves perhaps, and so on. If 
she comes to a point where there is no further activity she can do, she has exhausted all of 
her knowledge. This reinforces Wittgenstein’s emphasis on action and helps us 
understand how he intends to restrict meaning to this external sphere. We need to keep in 
mind the fact that the teacher does not perform any private act of ostensive definition that 
determines the meaning of “2n”. Every explanation of the meaning of “2n” the teacher 
can give to herself she can exhibit in her actions, and so if all of these explanations are 
exhausted in action, she has no further ‘private’ understanding to appeal to.  
 Two questions should be noted before continuing: (1) what role are interpretations 
playing here and (2) what are the exact resemblances that this account bears to the 
dispositional account discussed in chapter one. Concerning (1), we indeed need to be 
careful about the role interpretations play in this training, lest we implicitly commit 
ourselves to TA. As mentioned in PI 210, there is a role interpretations can play in 
mastering language. Various interpretations can occur to the mind of the student 
throughout this training, but they hang in the air with what they interpret – they do not 
determine meaning. Wittgenstein is not concerned with eliminating the idea that we 
interpret things at all and so he wants to acknowledge the legitimacy of our natural 
inclinations to stress the importance of our ability to interpret when learning our 
language. Indeed, he still refers to them at points, but what is essential for meaning here 
has to do with actions, and nothing to do with anything entirely private. Interpretations 
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can be brought into accord or conflict with any action, and so they are impotent when it 
comes to determining meaning. Wittgenstein explicitly discusses the superfluity of 
interpretations in his discussion of pain, but he makes this point more subtly in other 
cases: 
 “Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word ‘pain’ meant – 
so that he constantly called different things by that name – but nevertheless used the word 
in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain” – in short he 
uses it as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing 
else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism. (PI, 271) 
 
 […] Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the 
word “cube”, say the drawing of a cube. In what sense can this picture fit or fail to fit a 
use of the word “cube”? –Perhaps you say: “It’s quite simple; -- if that picture occurs to 
me and I point to a triangular prism for instance, and say it is a cube, then this use of the 
word doesn’t fit the picture.” – But doesn’t it fit? I have purposely so chosen the example 
that it is quite easy to imagine a method of projection according to which the picture does 
fit after all. (PI, 139) 
 
 […] So our ‘belief that the picture forced a particular application upon us’ 
consisted in the fact that only the one case and no other occurred to us. “There is another 
solution as well” means: there is something else that I am also prepared to apply such-
and-such a picture, such-and-such an analogy, and so on. 
 What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when 
we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both 
times? I think we shall say not. (PI, 140) 
 
I hearken back to earlier sections in the PI to draw a connection between the cases of pain 
and other words in our language because I do not want to bring in additional confusions 
just yet about mental states. Let us restrict our questions to rules and meaning for now. 
Images of leaves, the color green, cubes, and even pain are all the analogous counterparts 
for whatever private interpretation occurs to the students learning the mathematical rule 
“2n”. However, as we can see in each case, these are completely irrelevant when we are 
concerned with actions, when we are concerned with meaning. PI 271 is vital: the 
interlocutor asks a particular instance of the more general question: “What if completely 
different interpretations occurred to the student all the time and yet their actions never 
revealed their varying interpretations?” The answer is that if their actions are in line with 
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the use of a word, we can dismiss their private interpretations as irrelevant. This is 
brought out in PI 140 even more: consider two people who have the same interpretation 
occur to them, but who nevertheless use the word ‘cube’ differently. For example, 
perhaps both think of the ‘image’ of a cube in their minds, but then one projects this onto 
rectangular prisms while the other projects it onto cubes. Wittgenstein suggests that these 
people have the same meaning for the word ‘cube’, which seems highly plausible. This 
conclusion suggests that the existence of interpretations remains irrelevant for meaning 
and does not commit us to TA. 
 The interlocutor’s question remains weighty only if we accept the traditional 
distinction between meaning and action. If we have any residual urges to gasp at such a 
response, it is only because we are trying to hold onto our old biases. For example, one 
might want to accuse Wittgenstein of some form of verificationism.  “He is simply saying 
that we can only know what the student means based on their actions. Since their actions 
are finite, there will always be a possibility that they are following a different rule, for, as 
he himself was so apt to point out, these can accord with any number of rules.” But this 
response associates directly with the assumption we deny. There is not a possibility for 
the student to ‘mean one thing’ privately and do something else publicly. Wittgenstein 
does not ascribe to either a Russellian/Fregean or verificationist theory of meaning. 
 With the role of interpretations settled, we can turn to the question about the 
relationship between this account and the dispositional theory critiqued in chapter one. 
This picture of training bears more than a superficial relationship to the dispositional 
account. However, we must first clarify that the dispositional response in chapter one was 
offered as a response to the rule-following problems by someone who adopts TA, and we 
 51
showed how their account fails to meet their own requirements. Now that we have 
rejected TA, we can reevaluate possible benefits of some form of the dispositional 
account, while avoiding implicit commitment to TA.  
 Recall the thrust of the problems with the dispositional response: the finitude of 
our dispositions leaves the possibility open for us to be following an infinite number of 
possible rules and, since it is the rule that normatively dictates infinitely many 
applications of the word, this response merely establishes that whatever we feel is the 
correct application of a word is correct. This prohibits the possibility of mistaken 
applications of a rule, which in turn prohibits the possibility for teachers to correct their 
students in the course of their studies. However, both the dispositional response and its 
criticisms assume TA. The dispositional response intended to show how our actions can 
be brought into ‘accord’ with an abstract rule, and the problems raised against it showed 
how it failed to do so. Since we have rejected TA, any similarities that the role of training 
might bear to the dispositional account should be viewed as innocent until proven guilty 
of the earlier problems levied against dispositionalism. 
 With this confusion averted, we must turn back to training, recalling to mind 
crucial passages of Wittgenstein’s quoted earlier (namely: PI 198, 201, 208). One of the 
most important aspects of this training that might easily be overlooked is that the training 
takes time. A student does not learn the meaning of “2n” instantaneously. She must go 
through several examples over several days (or longer) under the guidance of her teacher. 
This process could be easy or arduous, but it will always be a kind of development over 
time. We come to master other words in our language in similar ways; indeed, the 
mastery of the English language takes many years (and when can we say to have finished 
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mastering English?) By being present in the classroom, the student is in a constant state 
of growth and change towards language mastery. 
 This training is analogous to physical development in illuminating ways. Both 
time and nourishment are needed for the development of a human. It is only after a 
sufficient number of years that the child can do things like run, jump, eat food, and even 
speak. The entirety of the child’s development was necessary for her to be able to do 
these things. Training can be seen exactly as a kind of development. We have been 
trained to react in certain ways to linguistic expressions in exactly the way that our 
development as an organism has made us able to react to physical stimuli in certain ways. 
For example, we can digest particular kinds of foods, and not others, we cannot breathe 
under water, but can otherwise, all because of our development. Similarly, we react to 
“2n” in this way, we call these things “green”, because of our training. Furthermore, just 
as our development entails novel multifarious interactions between cells, so too does our 
training put us in foreign environments with new interactions between known primitive 
gestures that move us towards language mastery.  
 This comparison illustrates the ways in which the meaningfulness of expressions 
in our extended language transcend the meanings in our primitive language. We start with 
relatively simple interactions among cells, but after a time we have a highly complex 
organism whose physical nature and capabilities go far beyond the limitations of the 
simple cells from which it originated. It also shows us how this account relates to 
dispositionalism. We have developed particular ways of reacting to sign-posts through 
our training over time, and so in a sense we might want to say we are “disposed” to act in 
certain ways towards them. However, the problems about normativity leveled against 
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dispositionalism in the first chapter do not arise in this account. The reasons 
dispositionalism failed there was because of a misguided assumption about meaning (TA) 
and the resulting normative requirements placed on meaningful language acquisition. 
 This comparison between training and development does more than just offer a 
new way of looking at training: it helps us answer the problem of normativity. Consider 
the question: “Why does the human body need water, specifically, to function? Why 
can’t it use sulfuric acid to hydrate itself instead?” Now, thanks to science, we do have 
initial answers to this question. A robust response presumably involves highly technical 
scientific jargon that is unnecessary for our purposes. Some short answer such as “Our 
bodies chemistry is such that our cells require H2O, and not sulfuric acid, to function” 
will suffice. Why is this answer satisfactory? Could we not just repeat our question at the 
level of chemistry? Why does H2O, and not sulfuric acid, react in these ways to these 
other chemicals? Now physics steps in with some explanation about how electrons and 
protons interact with each other, but what do we say to the interlocutor who asks, “Why 
does it take only two electrons to fill the first orbit of an atom, and not three?” This 
question seems to be a product of a deep misunderstanding. The only appropriate 
response to this question is simply that this is how things are. If you persist to ask 
“Why?”, I am inclined to say that you don’t understand what appropriate questions look 
like. We have exhausted all possible justifications, but physicists are not thereby 
somehow ignorant of what they are talking about, or unjustified in making the physical 
theories that they do.  
 This shows us exactly how we are to answer the problem of normativity. We have 
seen that normative requirements cannot be as rigid as those demanded by TA, but we 
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were still left with the question, “How do we know what the right way to follow any sign 
is?” Our answer is this question itself becomes meaningless after we have exhausted all of 
our justifications. This answer seems to be completely in line with what Wittgenstein had 
in mind:  
 “Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule – say a sign-post – got to do 
with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here? – Well, perhaps this one: I have 
been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. (PI, 198) 
 
 How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by himself whatever 
instruction you give him? – Well, how do I know? – If that means “Have I reasons?” the 
answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons. (PI, 211) 
 
 “How am I able to obey a rule?” – if this is not a question about causes, then it is 
about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. 
 If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is 
turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.” (PI, 217) 
 
To use a word without a justification does not mean to use it without right. (PI, 289) 
 
These quotes succinctly express our response. The bedrock of our training is analogous to 
the scientific statements of physics, while our extended training corresponds to the 
physical development we all undergo. If asked to justify the nature of our bedrock, we 
can only respond with a gape and an explanatorily void answer. Our reactions to the 
things we call “rules” express the nature of our bedrock: 
 “But the way we see it surely gives us everything!” – But that is not an 
observation about the segment of the series; or about anything that we notice in it; it gives 
expression to the fact that we look to the rule for instruction and do something, without 
appealing to anything else for guidance. (PI, 228) 
 
 “The line intimates to me which way I am to go” is only a paraphrase of: it is my 
last arbiter for the way I am to go. (PI, 230) 
 
Rules, in their multifarious forms and expressions, are simply sophisticated (audible or 
written) gestures that serve as the last arbiter for the way we should respond. Our 
particular response depends on our training and while we can give initial explanations or 
justifications for our behavior (in the same way that science can give explanations up to a 
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certain point), any supposed ultimate justification for why we respond in the way we do is 
doomed to incoherency. 
 All of these explanations about training lead us to an analogous worry that we 
used as a criticism against the dispositional response. There we saw that if the student’s 
dispositions governed correct uses of a word, then effective teaching becomes 
impossible, for we cannot actually correct the student’s responses at any given moment. 
Does a similar worry arise with this account of training? These questions hinge on our 
understanding of Wittgenstein’s use of ‘custom’ and his notion of community, as well as 
what I call his  positive private language argument, which brings us to our next chapter.
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Chapter Three: 
The Private Language Argument and the Problem of Other Minds 
 The picture of meaning sketched in the previous chapter directly aides our 
understanding of Wittgenstein’s infamous ‘private language argument’ (PLA), which will 
in turn buttress Wittgenstein’s dissolution of the mind/body problem. This chapter is 
accordingly divided into two parts: the first pins down the PLA while the second applies 
its conclusions and our previous lessons to address the status of ‘mental states’ and the 
problem of other minds. The first section argues that Wittgenstein denies that there can 
be any private language if one thinks that “privately following a rule” means performing 
some private mental act of grasping or ostensive definition. However, Wittgenstein does 
accept that there can be a kind of ‘private language’ if by this we are simply considering 
a physical person in isolation. These are two, albeit interrelated, conclusions that follow 
from the different meanings of the word “private” and the results of the previous two 
chapters. I give the name “negative PLA” to the former and “positive PLA” to the latter. 
The discussion of the positive PLA will address the questions about custom that we left 
off with in the end of the second chapter. The second part of this chapter starts by arguing 
for a rejection of the Cartesian distinction between mind and body, a move 
methodologically similar to our earlier rejection of the traditional assumption about 
meaning (TA). The chapter closes with a new conception of mental states and their 
relation to human beings. With this the stage will finally be set for our discussion of 
solipsism and the self. 
  
I. The “Private” Language Argument 
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 The previous chapter left us with some startling results, the main of which claims 
that there is no distinct division between meaning and action. We have also seen that 
traditional theories of semantic meaning based on TA should be rejected on pain of 
suffering devastating problems advanced by the rule-following considerations. Many 
such views rely not just on our ability to privately correlate words with meanings, but that 
this act of mental ostensive definition determines the meaning of all of our words. These 
views cohere with many of our intuitions. It seems to be a trivial truth that I can inwardly 
say a word to myself and give it a meaning, even without any particular external 
accompaniment. Moreover, after having done so, I could presumably use these words 
meaningfully, even though no one else would understand me. In this broad framework, 
many people endorse the possibility of a ‘private language’, and by this they mean that 
the meaningfulness of our words depends only upon the ability to privately ostensively 
bestow words with ‘meanings’. We considered two influential accounts of these 
‘meanings’: one where they were sensations and the other where they were abstract 
objective entities. For our purposes, the essential part of these theories lies in their 
commitment to this private mental act of meaning assignment. The sense in which these 
traditional theories use ‘private’ is one of the senses of the word that Wittgenstein 
considers in the negative PLA.14 
                                                 
14
 Before spelling out Wittgenstein’s refutation of the possibility of a ‘private language’ in this sense, I 
would like to note that I am not directly concerned with where this argument is to be found in the PI, 
whether before PI 243 or after. The later Wittgenstein was a decidedly unsystematic philosopher, and the PI 
clearly reflects this style of thinking. Therefore, I will use quotations from both before and after PI 243 to 
explain the PLA, for both sections seem to offer important points for the PLA’s defense. I am not 
concerned with a detailed exegesis of the PI, and so endorsing the view that the PLA is wholly contained 
within one section as opposed to another is irrelevant for our purposes. 
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 With this in mind, we can begin by noting that there are strong indications that 
parts of the negative PLA are contained in passages prior to PI 243, and PI 202 is a prime 
example: 
 And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule 
is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking 
one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it. (PI, 202) 
 
In light of the first two chapters, we can see that there will be significant problems facing 
an advocate of this kind of private language. There is no distinction between meaning and 
action, and ‘interpretations’, which here can be seen as acts of private mental ostensive 
definition, occurring to the speaker are irrelevant for meaning. Wittgenstein puts forth the 
negative PLA to combat those who would draw a distinction between inward private 
ostensive definition and actions that correspond to them. Wittgenstein fights this 
conception of meaning on its own grounds; the model commits itself to self-defeating 
problems about normativity and deep relativistic problems about meaning. A detailed 
discussion of the negative PLA lies in the first chapter, and so the short summary is 
presented here by way of contrast with the positive PLA. 
 What remains, and what is more interesting, is the positive PLA, which will 
elaborate our discussion of meaning from the second chapter. Wittgenstein hints at the 
possibility of there being something we might call a “private language” and Baker and 
Hacker suggest that meaningful language does not have to have anything to do with a 
community of people: 
 […] sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’ 
might be called a “private language”. (PI, 269) 
 
 […] in its original contexts in both manuscripts the remark that following a rule 
is a practice has nothing directly to do with social practices. Its exclusive concern is with 
the fact that rule-following is an activity, […] (Baker and Hacker 1984, p. 16) 
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When we considered our primitive community, we saw that their actions were 
meaningful, despite their sound’s irregular correlation with their circumstances. But 
before going further, we need to distinguish between two important scenarios that might 
be called instances of “private language”. Firstly, we can consider a physically isolated 
person who has not been raised in a society – i.e. who has not undergone any of the 
training we have received. Secondly, we could consider someone like Robinson Crusoe, a 
man raised in a community of language users who becomes marooned on an island. 
 On the authority of Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein apparently did discuss the 
case of Robinson Crusoe explicitly: 
 Interestingly, Wittgenstein did explicitly discuss Robinson Crusoe in his 
notebooks. MS 124 has an early version of Investigations S 243(a), a discussion of the 
imaginary monologuists, whose language is translatable by the explorer. Couldn’t we 
imagine people who speak only to themselves? In that case, Wittgenstein responds, each 
person could have his own language. There could be men who know only language-
games that one plays by oneself, viz. ordering oneself, telling oneself, asking and 
answering oneself, etc. How they learnt their language is here irrelevant, he adds. An 
explorer who observed the behaviour of such monologuists could translate their 
languages. Later Wittgenstein remarks that the private language that he has described 
above is one which Robinson could have spoken to himself on his island. If anyone had 
observed him, he could have learnt this language. For the meanings of the words of his 
(contingently) private language are shown in Robinson’s behaviour. (Baker and Hacker 
1984, p. 41) 
 
And in the footnote to this section they add: 
 Crusoe could certainly play language-games by himself, Wittgenstein remarks. 
If one secretly observed his sign-using activities, and if one discerned in them certain 
kinds of complex regularities, one would rightly judge him to be using a language of his 
own. (Baker and Hacker 1984, p. 41, my emphasis) 
 
There are a number of things to discuss from these quotes. For starters, I made the 
distinction between Robinson Crusoe, a man trained in a society, from someone raised 
isolated from any community of people, but from these quotes it appears that 
Wittgenstein considered how the solitary person learned their language to be irrelevant. 
While this might be initially misleading, it does nothing to hinder my distinction. The 
distinction is meant to contrast someone who has been trained, by whatever means, with 
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someone who has not. It is simply easier for us to envision training happening within a 
community of people.  
 Wittgenstein gives at least one somewhat specific requirement for the word 
“language”: what we call a “language” is a series of words with enough regularity for us 
to be able to translate it into our own language. This is directly related to the fact that we 
said learning what we call “rules” involves a training that forces regularity of action on a 
student, and it is clear that Wittgenstein emphasizes the need for training: “Following a 
rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a 
particular way.” (PI 206, my emphasis) What Wittgenstein does not specifically mention 
is that this training has to be done by a person (or by a community of people). 
Wittgenstein considers it logically possible for someone to receive training in a language 
from other places, such as their environment or their interactions with other animals, and, 
in so far as this is possible, we can consider it possible for there to be a “private 
language”.15 
                                                 
15
 Since I mentioned ‘logical possibility’, Baker and Hacker push this point further by noting 
Wittgenstein’s opinion on creatures born with the ability to speak a language readymade: 
 
 It is important to note that Wittgenstein countenances the logical possibility of 
creatures being born with the ability to speak a language. […] How one has learnt or 
acquired a language is irrelevant to an account of what one has learnt. […] Is his 
[Robinson Crusoe’s] continuing to be able to do so dependent on the history of his 
acquisition of his linguistic skills? That seems inconsistent with the principle that 
‘Teaching as the hypothetical history of our subsequent actions … drops out of our 
considerations’ (Blue and Brown Books, p. 14). 
 […] Wittgenstein concludes that to describe the language of a people is to 
describe a regularity of their behaviour, and to describe a language which someone 
speaks only to himself is to describe a regularity of his behaviour, and not something 
which can happen only once. (Baker and Hacker 1984, p. 20-1) 
 
I do not wish to digress too far into the differences between ‘logical’ and ‘physical’ impossibility for 
Wittgenstein. It suffices to say that I think Wittgenstein considers it physically impossible for someone 
to be born speaking a language already, although it is not logically impossible. (This is most likely 
related to his insistence that there is no logical impossibility for us to feel another person’s pain (i.e. PI 
302).) Training is physically necessary for us to learn language, but in what sense does it “drop out” of 
our considerations as irrelevant? It drops out only in so far as the observation of someone born 
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 There are marked differences between this kind of private language and the one 
attacked in the negative PLA. First of all, the language of the trained solitary individual is 
meaningful, just as marooned Robinson Crusoe’s language is meaningful. Our language 
games are behaviours – they are actions, and in so far as they are nuanced and highly 
developed actions is the extant to which they are meaningful. What we call “language” is 
only possible with a certain consistency in actions, which is of course possible for a 
solitary individual to develop. This is directly opposed to the view of private language 
attacked in the negative PLA, where the meaningfulness of an individual’s words lied in 
an act of private mental ostensive definition. Robinson Crusoe can talk to himself, give 
himself orders, and so on, because he has already mastered the technique of English; he 
has already been trained to do these sorts of things. However, this language is not in 
principle inaccessible by anyone else.  
 This settles how Wittgenstein intends us to understand ‘custom’ or ‘practice’. We 
can think of a custom that supports the training of a language to consist in a community 
of people. In fact, this is undoubtedly the most common way people do learn language. 
The environment in which most of us acquire language consists of extended periods of 
interaction with our parents, as well as other people, and these factors typically serve as 
the regulating force needed for training. The inherited trainings your parents and larger 
                                                                                                                                                 
speaking a language does not require an analysis of their previous linguistic history (indeed, because it 
is non-existent) for us to observe that they are following rules – i.e. that their actions are following 
certain regularities. We could translate this infant’s behavior; it would be a language. But think back to 
the analogy of development: this ‘logically possible’ case is analogous to someone being born 
immediately as an adolescent. I suppose that is ‘logically possible’ (and if it is not, then we have 
nothing to worry about). But now consider the role of explanations: in normal cases of language 
development, we can legitimately ask: “Why do you respond in the way you do upon the order ‘x’?” 
The answer to this appeals to our previous linguistic history, which of course must end at some point – 
when we have no further explanations. In this strange logically possible case, we hit bedrock 
immediately when we ask the infant “Why do you do what you do?” Of course, the lack of 
explanations does not force us into saying the infant’s actions are without meaning – it is just that in 
this case we have no explanations to offer.  
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community received provide a kind of ‘custom’ in which you learn language. The 
concept of ‘custom’ here is deeply analogous, and probably overlaps with ‘culture’ and 
the extent to which cultures vary gives us a good picture of how variable the customs in 
which we learn language can be. However, the question naturally arises: do we all have 
our own different ‘cultures’? In what sense can we be said to mean the same thing by our 
words? Moreover, if I speak English and hear someone misuse a word, what justifies me 
in correcting her? 
 The answer to these questions requires us to backtrack through our discussion in 
chapter two. Wittgenstein is sensitive to these problems, which he ultimately answers by 
an appeal to primitive language and ‘forms of life’.  
 Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we 
react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and 
another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right? 
 Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language 
quite strange to you. In what circumstances would you say that the people there gave 
orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on? 
 The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of 
which we interpret an unknown language. (PI, 206) 
 
 “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is 
false?” – It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the 
language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. (PI, 241) 
 
The foundation of all our complex language games rests on primitive language, and if we 
came upon someone who reacted differently to the gestures and sounds that constitute our 
primitive language, we can only say that they have a dramatically different form of life. 
This is similar to meeting someone who reacts to the pointing of a finger by looking in 
the opposite direction (PI 185): if you think that the ‘point’ of the pointing is to direct 
your attention in the opposite direction, then it seems that we must throw up our hands 
and resign ourselves to silence. This answer does not indicate a point of defeat; it is 
supported by deep natural inclinations and tendencies that can be brought out by means 
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of an example. Consider trying to teach a child to look in the opposite direction when 
given a gesture of pointing with the following caveat: you cannot use English (or another 
language) to do so. It seems highly implausible that you could get the child to look in the 
opposite direction under such constraints. This simple consideration shows why we 
should feel safe in adopting such a premise as a ‘brute fact’. 
 Returning to our more complex language games, we can consider another thought 
experiment to demonstrate our answer. Suppose I misuse the word “green” when 
describing the color of my hair to my friend (and that would currently be an inappropriate 
use), who proceeds to gape at my apparently sincere statement. After her shock wears off, 
she proceeds to try to convince me to retract my statement, presumably by means 
reminiscent of the training she underwent concerning the word “green”. Perhaps some of 
these initial explanations fail because they rest too much upon our extended language 
games, but ultimately she will do something that belongs to our primitive language. As a 
human being, it is impossible for me to misunderstand her at this point. Someone (or 
more properly something) who did not understand these gestures would not share the 
same form of life. (“If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.” (PI, p. 223)) The 
conclusion of this thought experiment claims that we can legitimately correct people 
using our language by an ultimate appeal to our primitive language. The common 
behaviors of humanity are the means by which we found any language, which explains 
why they are our only means of translating languages. Moreover, appealing to primitive 
language gives us a means of explaining our meaning of the word “green” to someone 
who misuses it. Three things are possible after we give such an explanation. The person 
could retract their former use of the word, followed by a correct use of the word. The 
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person could respond, “Oh that is not what I mean by ‘green’. I guess I use ‘green’ to 
mean what you call ‘brown’”, in which case we simply use different words for the same 
meaning. Here we are able to understand each other, although a process of translation is 
necessary to do so. The third possibility is that the person lacks the ability to learn the 
meaning of the word, which is certainly possible. Again, whether or not the person 
correctly learns the meaning of the word ‘green’ will manifest itself and be exhausted by 
the person’s actions. 
 This example demonstrates the role of custom again. We live in a community of 
language speakers whose uses of words are relatively uniform, and therefore whose 
meanings are relatively similar. People within our community occasionally misuse words, 
especially when it comes to esoteric or rare words and others are able to correct one 
another in so far as they can all appeal to similar trainings they have received. If these 
appeals fail, we can teach the meanings of our words by relying on our primitive 
language. But we are certainly not able correct the uses of words in a different language. 
Moreover, there is no one set or permanent “correct” use of a word in these extended 
languages, for each of them merely represents a highly complicated form of life. As 
humans, there might be extensive overlap in the forms of life between people who speak 
different languages. This comes from the fact that we all share our primitive language. 
But the meanings of our extended language games that transcend the meanings present in 
our common behaviors are not constrained by any objectively normative requirements. 
People can only correct one another’s use of a word in so far as they all participate in the 
same form of life and there is no objective standard establishing correct or incorrect uses 
of words outside of this. 
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 We return to our distinction between the trained and untrained solitary person. 
What of the actions of the solitary individual who has not been trained? Perhaps the 
easiest answer is “there is not enough regularity for us to call it ‘language’.” (PI 207) 
There is nothing preventing this individual from developing a “private language”, but it is 
essential to note that the absence of a language for this individual, private or not, does not 
mean that all her actions are meaningless. She still has recourse to her primitive 
expressions, to that which requires no training. It would only be in some strange 
hypothetical scenario where she was somehow ‘frozen’, unable to act, where she would 
be incapable of expressing any meaning. Our ability to act serves as the foundation for all 
of our language and, namely, our sensation language, which we should turn to now. 
 
II. Descartes’ Error and the New Status of “Mental States” 
 The entirety of this essay has so far been concerned solely with the philosophy of 
language, and, more specifically, the meaningfulness of our language. This section is the 
first proper application of our conclusions to the realm of philosophy of mind. Naturally, 
there are deep affinities between Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and his 
philosophy of mind, and so this section begins by comparing these two aspects of his 
thought, namely by drawing the connections between his rejection of the Cartesian 
distinction between mind and body and his dismissal of the traditional assumption about 
meaning (TA), which says that there are two separate and discrete entities necessary for 
meaningful discourse: physical linguistic expressions and the ‘meanings’ that attach to 
them. This is followed by a quick summary of the traditional problem of other minds, and 
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the chapter ends with a description of Wittgenstein’s understanding of “mental states” 
and their relationship to our notion of a human being. 
 This essay began with a broad, somewhat platitudinous statement about the 
interpenetration between all fields in philosophy, but here we have clear for evidence for 
this truth. The Cartesian distinction between mind and body has dominated the 
philosophy of mind since the seventeenth century. Let us call this “the Cartesian 
Assumption” (CA), which more precisely claims that there are two separate and discrete 
entities, the ‘mind’ and the ‘body’, that combine together in someway to form a human. It 
is philosophy’s business to establish how this is done.16 There are clear structural 
similarities between the theories of those philosophers of mind who adopt CA and 
philosophers of language who adopt TA. One says, “Here the mind, there the body” 
while the other says, “Here the meaning, there the (physical) use of the word”, and both 
then set to work figuring out the relationship between the elements of each dichotomy. 
TA divorces meaning from action, thereby leaving action as something impotent without 
its corresponding meaning. In the same way, CA divorces mind from body. Traditionally, 
not all bodies have minds, but certain ones, namely human bodies, may possess them. 
Adopting CA causes a division between bodies, which become mere physical, senseless 
objects, and minds that are ‘in’ them somehow. But the relationship between these 
philosophies goes beyond structure. The CA gives us a distinctly private picture of the 
                                                 
16
 To say the least, we would go too far a field to even briefly discuss the multiple influential theories 
based on this assumption. Moreover, in the spirit of fairness, we should note that this distinction can 
lead to some solutions to philosophical problems, depending on the brand of Cartesianism you adopt. 
For example, questions of personal identity gain some headway with this distinction. How are we the 
same people over time even though our bodies are in constant flux? Our minds stay the same while our 
bodies change, and having the same mind is what is necessary for personal identity. Needless to say, 
there are numerous problems that riddle such a response, as there are for many Cartesian theories. In 
any case, while these and related problems are undoubtedly interesting, I will restrict our discussion to 
the traditional problem of other minds that faces anyone adopting CA. 
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mind, and it is in this realm that private ostensive definitions supposedly take place. 
Philosophers adopting both CA and TA point to the mind as the bearer of our sensations 
and the source of our understanding. Appealing to the privacy of our minds explained 
things like why we felt there could be private languages, how we could grasp the rule 
“2n”, how we knew the meaning of the word “red” and various other problems.  
 Before jumping to our rejection of CA, we should summarize the traditional 
problem of other minds to gain a clear view of our target. Here is the problem: I have 
private access to my mind, a kind of access to which no one else is privileged. I know 
what “red” means based off of my own private sample of the color in my mind; I know 
what “pain” means based off of my own experience of pain. After various experiences, 
these meanings are definitively pinned down by private ostensive definition, the very 
process we have shown to be incoherent. Adopting such a method leads to the following 
problems. If meanings are established privately in each individual’s minds, how do I 
know that another person means the same thing I do by the word “pain”? And what about 
“red”? And what about the rest of language? In fact, these worries extend beyond the 
meanings of our words: since I cannot directly perceive the existence of someone else’s 
mind, how do I know that they have minds at all? I merely see their bodies, which are 
separate from their minds, and so how can I be sure that they are not sophisticated 
robots? Am I the only real human being, whose mind I know to a certainty to be in its 
natural communion with this body? 
 The problem of other minds gains support from another important consideration. 
Crucial evidence for the plausibility of CA lies in the fact that there are cases of illusion 
where we might be deceived into thinking someone is in pain when they are not. 
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Moreover, there are cases, such as instances of acting, where we know the actor is not in 
pain, even though her behavior mimics that of a person genuinely in pain. These cases 
support a natural inclination to divorce the workings of the mind from physical bodies 
because in both we observe physical behaviors typically expressive of genuine pain in 
tandem with the subject not actually being in pain. CA derives strength from these 
inclinations: we want to say that the particular physical behaviors of a person are not 
enough for us to establish that we know they are in pain. 
 There are two things that we should consider at this point. Since we have 
established that our words are meaningful only in so far as they used in certain ways 
coordinate with actions and circumstances, we should clarify how sensation language fits 
this mold. This first involves dissolving our conviction that sensations are ‘objects’ to 
which we have private access. The next step deals with the cases of illusion by explaining 
what role these cases play in our new understanding of sensations. 
 The CA gives us a model of sensations that Wittgenstein would call “object and 
designation”. Our sensation words are nouns after all, and so it seems proper that 
sensations should be objects within our minds. Now, CA implies that the meanings of our 
sensation words are established by private ostensive definition, but we have seen that this 
is impossible. The meaning of the word “pain” does not consist in the private correlation 
of the word with an inner sensation, but still an advocate of CA might insist that surely 
there is something that goes on inside us that our neighbors do not have access to. We can 
appeal to Wittgenstein’s famous ‘beetle-in-a-box’ passage to stamp out this temptation:  
 Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! – 
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a “beetle”. No one can look 
into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at 
his beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in 
his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. – But suppose the 
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word “beetle” had a use in these people’s language? – If so it would not be used as the 
name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even 
as a something for the box might even be empty. – No, one can ‘divide through’ by the 
thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. 
 That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the 
model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (PI, 
293) 
 
Since the meanings of our words lie in their use in our activities, any possible private 
thing that individuals associate sensations words with ‘drops out of our considerations as 
irrelevant’, for our sensation words are not concerned with things. Sensations are not 
objects of private experience; we must reject this model of ‘object and designation’ for 
our sensation language. Indeed, what keeps us attached to the view that sensations are 
objects when the meaningfulness of our sensation words would remain unaltered if there 
were no private sensation objects at all? 
 This is one of the primary applications of our lessons in the philosophy of 
language onto philosophy of mind. The essential point is that we are not committed to 
talking about sensations as being ‘objects’ in the ‘mind’ of a subject when we engage in 
the problems of the philosophy of mind. The meaningfulness of our sensation language 
does not consist in referring to objects of any kind and so if we want to have a meaningful 
discussion about sensations we can avoid all of the problems posed by the Cartesian 
assumption. 
 This move makes it seem like Wittgenstein comes dangerously close to 
behaviorism. Is he saying that sensations merely are physical actions, physical 
behaviors? The difference between Wittgenstein’s stance and behaviorism is subtle, but 
ultimately dramatically distances Wittgenstein from behaviorism: 
 “But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behavior 
accompanied by pain and pain-behavior without any pain?” – Admit it? What greater 
difference could there be? – “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the 
sensation itself is a nothing.” – Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! 
The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about 
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which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force 
itself on us here. 
 The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that 
language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey 
thoughts – which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please. 
(PI, 304) 
 
The problem with behaviorism is that it assumes CA just as whole-heartedly as any 
Cartesian. The essential point of behaviorism is it reduces mental states to the same kind 
of merely physical bodily movements. These are the same bodily actions that dualists try 
to connect with mental states. But this view adopts a seriously misguided conception of 
what might be called the ‘logic of mental states’ (“Grammar tells us what kind of object 
anything is.” (PI 373)). Wittgenstein suggests that mental states cannot be reduced to 
‘merely physical’ actions. Behaviorism advocates such a reduction, although not an 
‘elimination’, of the mental. 
 “Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really 
saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?” – If I do speak of a fiction, 
then it is of a grammatical fiction. (PI 307) 
 
 How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
about behaviourism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We 
talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall 
know more about them – we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of 
looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a 
process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was 
the very one that we thought quite innocent.) – And now the analogy which was to make 
us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended 
process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental 
processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them. (PI, 308, my emphasis) 
 
The “grammatical” fiction comes from our ‘first step that altogether escapes our notice’. 
We adopted CA, and in doing so became committed to dividing up human action into 
senseless bodily movements accompanied by mental states that are ‘objects in a mind’. 
Since we have denied the role any ‘private’ sensations might have in determining 
meaning, it looks like we should adopt behaviorism, but that is not what we want to do. 
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Rather, we should reject CA, and try to give a more accurate account of the true grammar 
of our sensation language.  
 So what are we left with after we reject CA? Drawing upon our earlier results, 
recall our primitive society. There, the meanings of primitive gestures and expressions 
were completely bound up with the surrounding circumstances and actions. The actions 
of our fellow humans are the primitive, and, in an important sense, primary vehicles for 
meaning. By rejecting CA, we are left with a merger of mind and body back into their 
natural home. John McDowell expresses this contrast succinctly: 
 One way of approaching Wittgenstein’s response is to remark that such a picture 
[one based on CA] is attainable only by displacing the concept of a human being from its 
focal position in an account of our experience of our fellows, and replacing it with a 
philosophically generated concept of a human body. […] In these terms, Wittgenstein’s 
response to the sceptic is to restore the concept of a human being to its proper place, not 
as something laboriously reconstituted, out of the fragments to which the sceptic reduces 
it, by a subtle epistemological and metaphysical construction, but as a seamless whole of 
whose unity we ought not to have allowed ourselves to lose sight in the first place. 
(McDowell 1982, p. 469-70) 
 
The sceptic McDowell refers to is someone who claims it is possible that all other 
humans do not really have mental states, but this doubt rests firmly upon CA. What we 
have left over is not a mere human body but a human being. The primitive actions of 
these beings give us cases with perfect access to their mental states because what we 
might call their “behaviors” are conceptually tied up with what we might call their 
“mental states”. There is textual evidence for this stance in Wittgenstein as well: 
 “But doesn’t what you want to say come to this: that there is no pain, for 
example, without pain-behaviour?” – It comes to this: only of a living human being and 
what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can on say: it has sensation; it sees; 
is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious. (PI, 281) 
 
 More needs to be said about the grammar of our sensation language. There is an 
important similarity between the cases of mathematical language and sensation language 
that will flesh out this point. We cannot reduce mathematical objects to physical objects 
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for the same reason that we cannot reduce mental states to mere physical behavior. All 
attempts to do so misconstrue the meaning of mathematical statements by trying to force 
our understanding of them into the model of ‘object and designation’, which is 
paradigmatic of the natural sciences but not necessarily of other language games. We 
naturally pursue such projects because of the superficial resemblance between the 
grammar of mathematical objects and of our physical objects. This is related to the 
distinction Wittgenstein makes between ‘surface’ and ‘depth’ grammar (PI 664): we are 
lead by the surface grammar of our mathematical statements to think of numbers as 
objects in the same way that tables and chairs are objects. But this misleads us, and the 
differences between the two kinds of statements can be brought out quickly. We say, 
“She owns a chair” but not “She owns a three” or “She owns the integers”. In fact, 
numbers often function as adjectives, not as nouns. “She owns three chairs” is a 
legitimate sentence. The ontological status of numbers has been so troublesome for many 
philosophers because they assume that ‘only the physical’ is ‘real’, and so they proceed 
to try to ‘reduce’ many of our language games into statements about purely physical 
objects. But numbers are not things at all, and this does not need to worry anyone if they 
can accept the varying grammatical structures of our language. In the same way, we can 
comfortably say that mental states are not things. To do otherwise would incorrectly 
apply the grammar of one language game onto another, only resulting in extensive 
confusion. 
 There is another important conclusion we reach after considering the ‘logic’ of 
our sensation language. Despite all that has been said, one might want to insist, “Still, my 
sensations must be private! You do not feel what I feel when I feel pain!” This statement 
 73
emphasizes a grammatical point about our sensation language. “The proposition 
‘Sensations are private’ is comparable to ‘One plays patience by oneself’.” (PI 248) 
Solitaire (also known as ‘patience’) is a game that one plays by oneself, but that reason 
does not mean that no one can learn solitaire from observing someone play the game. 
Moreover, people who know how to play solitaire understand the actions of another 
solitaire player. The mere fact that ‘sensations are private’ does not mean that no one 
knows what you are talking about when you say “I am in pain”. The language game of 
mental states has a meaning that is publicly visible to everyone, and the mere 
grammatical facts governing it do not commit us to a metaphysical picture of mental 
states that precludes the possibility of others meaning the same things by their words.   
 We acquire a better picture of the nature of our sensation language by considering 
cases of illusion again. We have developed a language that has phrases like “The chair is 
made of wood” and others like “The chair appears to me to be made of wood”. These say 
different things. The first says that the chair actually is made of a particular substance, 
while the second says that it merely appears to me that it does. We have equivalent 
statements in our sensation language. We can say both that “She is in pain” and “She 
appears to be in pain”. Let us focus on the statements about the chair. How was it 
established in the first place that there could be illusions about there being a chair in front 
of me? We have developed a language to deal with specific cases of mirages, but would it 
be possible for there to be only illusions of chairs? Perhaps one might think of this 
scenario as one where we just fell through chairs, couldn’t put our hands on them, and so 
on. In this sense, perpetual “illusion” would be possible, but “illusion” is in scare quotes 
here for a reason. Illusions are only established to be deceptive by reference to another 
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experience that establishes contrary conclusions. In other words, we determine a case to 
be illusory by an appeal to another experience that reveals the deceptive nature of the 
case in question. This statement or experience cannot be illusory itself. For example, if 
there were ‘nothing but illusions’ in the sense described above, there would be nothing 
truly illusory about chairs. Chairs would simply be objects that we could see but not 
touch or sit on. If it happened occasionally that people successfully sat on these kinds of 
chairs, that would be illusory.  
 These conclusions have immediate upshots for the case of pain. It is true that we 
have cases of deception or acting where we might be tricked into believing someone is in 
pain when they are not. However, it would be impossible for there to be nothing but 
“false” moves in our language game of sensations. Wittgenstein explicitly endorses this: 
 “If it is possible for someone to make a false move in some game, then it might 
be possible for everybody to make nothing but false moves in every game.” Thus we are 
under a temptation to misunderstand the logic of our expression here, to give an incorrect 
account of the use of our words. 
 Orders are sometimes not obeyed. But what would it be like if no orders were 
ever obeyed? The concept ‘order’ would have lost its purpose. (PI 345) 
 
Correct moves in our sensation language are established by the primitive notion we have 
of a human being. The actions of these beings provide the foundation for our sensation 
language. These kinds of actions show us when someone is really in pain. Undoubtedly, 
we have a highly complex extended language game that accounts for cases of deception, 
but there need to be cases where someone is actually in pain (for example, the thought 
experiment considered in chapter two where a person falls to the floor writhing in pain) 
to retain our notion of the game at all. If no one’s actions actually expressed their pain, 
we would lose the concept of pain altogether. This would not mean simply that we might 
always be in error when we claim someone is in pain, but that we would not actually have 
the concept to begin with.  
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 For clarity’s sake, we may introduce a distinction in this argument between what I 
will call the metaphysical and the epistemological questions concerning pain. 
Metaphysical questions about pain are concerned with whether or not someone is actually 
in pain, regardless of our means of acquiring knowledge of this fact. Epistemological 
questions about pain are concerned with how we come to know someone else is in pain. 
In this way, there is a dependence of epistemological question upon metaphysical ones: 
we cannot know that someone is in pain unless it is actually possible for people to be in 
pain. This distinction informs an objection against the argument above. It seems that I 
have established the metaphysical necessity of pain – there need to be cases where people 
are actually in pain in order for our language to make sense – but this falls short of 
important epistemological requirements. While we may be in a position to potentially 
acquire knowledge of another’s pain thanks to our metaphysical considerations, questions 
about how exactly we come to know someone is in pain remain. 
 This distinction brings out an important relationship between our primitive and 
extended languages that has been hinted at frequently. Our primitive language serves as 
the foundation of our extended languages and within this primitive mode of 
communication it seems that in certain scenarios we cannot possibly doubt the pain of 
others (i.e. person writhing on the floor example). But the question is: does this primitive 
gesture express “pain”? “Pain” is a word in our extended language game, and so we have 
a right to wonder whether the certainty we have in our primitive language carries over 
into our extended language. This point informs the objection above: our response to the 
problem of other minds may have established that we need cases of genuine pain for our 
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language to make sense, but it remains uncertain whether or not the rules governing our 
extended language retain the certainty present in our primitive language. 
  The answer to this question hinges on a dilemma: either our extended sensation 
language retains cases where we have no doubt as to whether someone is in a given 
mental state or we have lost access to this epistemological certainty somewhere in the 
process of extension. I will not definitely come down on either of these sides, but simply 
remark that neither present difficulties for my position. Needless to say, the first case is 
more desirable and might be plausible for a few reasons. When we learn sensation 
language, we are taught to replace exclamations of pain, such as screaming and groaning, 
with the words “I am in pain”. While the extent to which these expressions are exactly 
equivalent may be open for debate, it seems plausible that the transition from the former 
expression to the latter could easily retain the epistemological certainty of the former. 
This explains why the smile of an unweaned infant is not pretense (PI, 249): we are 
actually certain of the happiness of the child, which is a mental state. This brings out a 
deep relationship between our primitive gestures and sensations language. In cases of our 
primitive language, we may say that we know others to be in mental states because no 
degree of certainty was lost in extension. Indeed, the bulk of this essay supports this 
reading and defense of Wittgenstein. 
 The second alternative is more problematic, which claims that our concept of pain 
does not retain the epistemological certainty we have of primitive gestures. A thorough 
discussion of Wittgenstein’s epistemology is beyond the scope of this essay, but, more 
importantly, is somewhat tangential for our purposes. We should note that this alternative 
does not affect our metaphysical considerations, which are significant conclusions in their 
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own right. There must be genuine cases of pain, although we do not necessarily know 
which are genuine in any particular case. This solves the aspect of the problem of other 
minds important to our inquiry: other people must have mental states, on pain of 
undermining the meaningfulness of the language that states the problem. That being said, 
the remaining epistemological questions are surely important. I believe the solution to 
these doubts lies in a kind of transcendental argument against this epistemological 
scepticism, which comes from Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty and relies on 
Wittgenstein’s notion of “criteria”.17 The argument claims something like the following. 
The sceptical worries advanced by these epistemic questions would undermine the 
meaningfulness of the sceptic’s thesis itself. Spatial limits prohibit a further explanation 
of this stance, but since the success or failure of this argument has no effect on our 
metaphysical considerations, we can proceed safely.18 
 This chapter has made several important conclusions. Building off our 
conclusions from chapter two, we have discussed the real sense in which people may 
have private languages, i.e. in a way that does not preclude others from learning them. 
                                                 
17
 I have largely avoided discussion of criteria because of numerous controversies surrounding 
Wittgenstein’s use of the word. I take Wittgenstein’s use of “criteria” to be intentionally vague for the 
purpose of dissuading systematic analysis. He considers it an impossible task to delimit the rules governing 
our languages, mainly because we constantly invent new languages with new rules. There is no theoretical 
limitation constraining the rules we might invent, and so an attempt to pin down the exact criteria necessary 
for a given language seems impossible. 
18
 The literature on Wittgenstein’s use of ‘criteria’ is vast to say the least. Kripke only loosely discusses it 
in his account (see Kripke 1982, p. 98 – 103). One influential account of this comes from Baker and 
Hacker’s defeasibility notion of criteria (Baker and Hacker 1984). McDowell attacks this and offers 
‘disjunctivism’ in its place. McDowell defines disjunctivism thusly: “But suppose we say […] that an 
appearance that such-and-such is the case can be either a mere appearance or the fact that such-and-such is 
the case making itself perceptually manifest so someone.” (McDowell 1982, p. 472) This stance holds that 
on any given case of perception we may either be experiencing an illusion (a mere appearance) or a 
genuine fact that such-and-such is the case. There are affinities between my view and McDowell’s, 
although the way in which we arrive at our conclusions is different. McDowell points out significant 
problems with CA and then offers disjunctivism as a tenable alternative, whereas my argument suggests 
that some kind of disjunctivism must be true, not merely that it is an unproblematic option. McDowell’s 
solution to the epistemic concerns hinted at here claims that knowledge does not require certainty. This 
seems to fall short of what we really want from knowledge, but I cannot comment on this further here. 
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We have also rejected the Cartesian distinction between mind and body, offering a new 
account of sensation language in its place. This account ensures that others must have 
mental states, although the method by which we know about people’s mental states 
remains debatable. In any case, mental states are decidedly not restricted to a private 
realm in principle inaccessible to others. Rejecting this notion of privacy leads us to 
consider the self, which has often been considered the bearer of mental states. More 
importantly, the traditional conception of the self brings with it a notion of private 
communion that obtains between each of us and our respective selves. This will be 
attacked in both chapter four and the epilogue. 
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Chapter Four: 
The Dissolution of Solipsism 
 This essay has been tracing Wittgenstein’s ideas on various topics, displaying a 
chain of thought linking them together, and now at last we reach the culminating point in 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of solipsism. The progression of the arguments we have been 
considering have an important linear structure. We began with ‘rules’ and adopted a 
traditional assumption about meaning, TA, which claims that there are two separate and 
discrete entities associated with our language: the physical use of the linguistic symbol 
and the ‘meaning’ that relates to it. We saw how this lead to irrevocable incoherencies, 
and so to retain the meaningfulness of our language, we concluded that the 
meaningfulness of our language consists in the particular actions and circumstances of its 
use, with or without a community of people providing training for individuals. There are 
no such things as abstract ‘meanings’ divorced from particular circumstances and actions. 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of meaning eliminates the possibility that any kind of private 
realm assists in ascribing meaning to our language. This conclusion directly implies that 
the meanings of the words that we consider a part of our ‘sensation language’ are only 
meaningful in so far as they are coordinate with certain actions. The meaning of these 
actions does not rely on the model of ‘object and designation’; instead, these meanings 
arise not from the philosophically constructed notion of a human body but from the 
primitive notion of a human being, whose actions manifest ‘mental states’ in their 
fundamentally familiar way. While we did not establish conclusively our epistemic 
relation to cases of mental states, we determined that others must possess them in order 
for our language to be meaningful at all. 
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 The layout of the chapter relies on these conclusions and follows a familiar 
pattern. The chapter begins by laying out the distinction between realist and solipsistic 
theories of the self. Two main versions of solipsism are articulated: epistemological and 
metaphysical solipsism. These versions are then elaborated upon by giving initial reasons 
why they appear appealing because of the surface grammar of “to perceive” and “I”. This 
is followed by the attack on solipsism, which consists in two main parts. The first claims 
that the ‘model of object and designation’ for the self will not work, relying on the 
conclusions of the previous chapters. The second part responds to the initial reasons that 
seemed to support the solipsist’s position. The chapter ends by summarizing our 
conclusions and their relation to each other.  
 
The Traditional Assumption about the Self: Its Advocates: 
 The debate between solipsism and realism concerning the self should be seen as 
the last desperate attempt of traditionally minded philosophers to insist on the primacy of 
a private mental realm. These two main contenders share a fundamental assumption: both 
believe that the self is a kind of “object” with which we are in intimate private 
communion. Call this the traditional assumption about the self (SA). However, realism 
and solipsism differ dramatically, so we should be clear on these points of divergence 
before continuing. 
 A realist claims that each individual has a ‘self’, which has a peculiar nature 
(immaterial or material), that each of us refers to when we use “I” in “I am in pain”. The 
ontological status of these selves needs explaining, but we refer to them in the same way 
that we refer to physical objects or the referents of proper names. I am not directly 
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concerned with elaborating the realist view, mainly because the arguments levied against 
solipsism attack realism as well.  
 The solipsist denies that each individual has a self, insisting that there is only one 
Self, which serves as a kind of transcendental viewpoint.19 There are a few different 
brands of solipsism, but all of them are difficult to define precisely. Wittgenstein made 
several attempts in the Blue Book that seem to be acceptable definitions: 
 Sometimes the most satisfying expression of our solipsism seems to be this: 
“When anything is seen (really seen), it is always I who see it”.  
 […] What tempted me to say “it is always I who see when anything is seen” I 
could also have yielded to by saying: “whenever anything is seen, it is this which is 
seen”, accompanying the word “this” by a gesture embracing my visual field (but not 
meaning by “this” the particular objects which I happen to see at the moment). (BB, p. 
61, 64) 
 
 Why is anyone tempted to hold such a bizarre and counter-intuitive theory? We 
fall into solipsism if we combine a broadly Cartesian epistemology with an emphasis on 
some peculiar aspects of the surface grammar of our words “I” and “to perceive”. The 
essence of a Cartesian epistemology holds that we have infallible access to the way things 
appear to us. We have perfect knowledge of our perceptions. The way things actually are 
is up for doubt, but we certainly know how things seem to us. This starting point serves 
as a kind of methodological solipsism: if we can gain knowledge of the external world 
and other minds, we have to start with what is indubitably certain to us, a la Descartes’ 
method of doubt. 
                                                 
19
 The doctrine of solipsism is best understood through the mouth of a particular speaker due to the peculiar 
fact that, if properly understood, you should hold that the speaker falsely says “When anything is seen, it is 
always I who see it” because in fact you hold this unique position. This is a perplexing result, but not 
logically inconsistent. Any individual can advocate solipsism if they wish, it is just that if they meet another 
who believes in solipsism they will have to claim that their position is false. After this peculiar aspect of the 
doctrine is noted, it will be easier to refer to ‘the solipsist’ instead of the ‘theory of solipsism’ because it 
would be strange to say that a group of people endorsed solipsism. All of them hold the ‘same’ view, but 
every single one of them believes that all the others are completely misguided! In any case, I will refer to 
the individual ‘solipsist’ from now on rather than the ‘theory of solipsism’ to avoid this confusion. 
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 From here, the solipsist can take two routes: epistemological solipsism and 
metaphysical solipsism. An epistemological solipsist comes to her position by a gross 
extension of the problem of other minds. We have room to doubt the existence of the 
entire external world, not just other minds. If the true correspondence between our 
perceptions and reality can be called into doubt on any given occasion, which happens in 
cases of illusion, then we are at risk of never having perceptions that genuinely access the 
world. These considerations lead the solipsist to limit her knowledge to her own 
experiences.  
 The metaphysical solipsist thinks that the epistemological solipsist moves in the 
right direction, but stops short of the real truth. This Self is the source of reality for the 
metaphysical solipsist and if the Self ceases to exist, so does the world. Support for this 
stronger claim comes from the solipsist’s insistence on the peculiar reference of “I” in 
sentences like “I am in pain” or “I have this perception”. Who has these perceptions? Or 
what is in pain? Since “I” in these sentences functions in a manner superficially similar to 
pronouns that do refer, such as “He is eight feet tall”, “He is in pain”, we are lead to 
believe that there must be something to which “I” refers. This peculiar entity bears all the 
perceptions discussed above, thereby serving as the bearer of the world, in a sense. The 
metaphysical solipsist uses the referent of “I” to go beyond the epistemological solipsist 
by maintaining that the ‘visual field’ is all that ever exists. Whenever anything is seen, it 
is THIS which is seen. From the standpoint of an individual, the sort of gesture 
accompanying this statement is supposed to highlight more than the epistemological 
solipsist’s claim that we have infallible knowledge of our perceptions. It is supposed to 
point to the ‘fact’ that our experiences are the only possible experiences, because, in a 
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sense, they are the only things that happen. The metaphysical solipsist says, “Every thing 
is really just a perception, and I hold these perceptions.” In this way, we are supposed to 
be convinced that nothing outside of our own perceptions exists. 
 
“But what do you mean?” 
 With our previous chapters in mind, much should appear wrong with either of 
these solipsistic positions. We can apply our conclusions about mental states and cases of 
illusion in chapter three to the case of the epistemological solipsist. Regarding our 
metaphysical considerations, there must be cases of genuine perception of external 
objects. While we may not have established the exact way in which we differentiate 
between veridical and illusory cases, we must have some genuine cases of perception. 
This undermines the epistemological solipsist’s claim that we might never have genuine 
perceptions of external objects. There are two questions that follow from these 
conclusions that need answering: (1) how exactly does this conclusion establish the 
existence of things outside our minds and (2) what aspect of the grammar of “to 
perceive” tricked us into believing such a wild hypothesis? 
 Regarding (1), the epistemological solipsist’s conclusion was that we had to doubt 
our knowledge of external objects based on the fact that our perceptions can deceive us. 
In response, Wittgenstein says: 
 The point here is not that our sense-impressions can lie, but that we understand 
their language. (PI, 355) 
 
Surely our sensations can deceive us and it may prove difficult to prove to a certainty the 
veridical or illusory status of any given perception. However, it could not be the case that 
all of our sense-impressions are really illusions. Our language of perceptions accounts for 
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cases of deception, but this is merely one complicated rule governing our language game 
of sensations. It would be an improper logical inference to conclude that all of our 
perceptions might be illusory based only on this grammatical fact. The grammatical fact 
only allows for the possibility of some of our perceptions to be illusions. Implicit in this 
grammatical fact lies our ability to have genuine cases of the perception of external 
objects because it is on this more primary and fundamental aspect of our language game 
of sensations that the possibility of illusions rests. The upshot of this is straightforward: 
some of our perceptions must be veridical, so we do perceive things external to us, 
although we lack a detailed knowledge of which perceptions are truthful. 
 Part of the reason we were tempted into this kind of doubt lies in the fact that the 
grammar of “to perceive” allows us to speak of cases of deception but also because it is a 
necessary part of the grammar governing “to perceive” that “only I have access to my 
own perceptions”. This is a restriction on the proper use of “to perceive”. It would be 
inaccurate to say “My friend has my perception of green” or “I have my friend’s sense-
impression of softness”, but these are trivial truths. More importantly, this grammatical 
remark does not allow us to conclude that the existence of the external world can be 
called into doubt.  
 The metaphysical solipsist is in bad shape as well. There are two initial arguments 
against her position, both relying on our previous conclusions. Firstly, the “I” in “I am in 
pain” does not refer in the typical sense of ‘reference’ and secondly “I am in pain” 
essentially means the same thing as groaning does and groaning does not pick out the 
Self the solipsist believes to exist.20 If the solipsist insists that her position is coherent and 
                                                 
20
 This ‘essentially’ will be fleshed out later. The statement that “I am in pain” and groaning are exactly 
equivalent is perhaps too crude to be correct. Let us suspend judgment until later on. 
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that it is simply a deficiency in our language that prohibits her from expressing her point, 
we have to insist that the very expression of her point relies on an abuse of the meanings 
of the words she employs. 
 The first argument is best understood after making a distinction. The referential 
aspect of a statement like “I am in pain” differs from statements like, “I have ten fingers”. 
In “I am in pain” the statement is using the ‘subject-use’ of reference while in “I have ten 
fingers” “I” is functioning as an ‘object-use’ of reference. Wittgenstein endorses this 
distinction: 
 Now the idea that the real I lives in my body is connected with the peculiar 
grammar of the word “I”, and the misunderstandings this grammar is liable to give rise 
to. There are two different cases in the use of the word “I” (or “my”) which I might call 
“the use as object” and “the use as subject”. […] One can point to the difference between 
these two categories by saying: The cases of the first category involve the recognition of 
a particular person, and there is in these cases the possibility of an error, […] On the 
other hand, there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have toothache. To 
ask “are you sure that it’s you who have pains?” would be nonsensical. (BB, p. 66-7) 
 
In these cases of object-use reference, there is a possibility of misidentifying the true 
referent. These possibilities are not present in the subject-use sense of reference. We 
cannot mistakenly refer to ourselves when we say “I am in pain”. It makes no sense to 
say “I do not know whether or not I am in pain” (see PI 408). These considerations 
illustrate the difference between the referential aspect of the object-use of “I” and the 
meaning of subject-uses of “I”.  
 The solipsist might agree to this distinction and continue to insist that they are 
simply advocating a truth hitherto unacknowledged about the metaphysical structure of 
the world. They are trying to use our language to stress a new point, trying to overcome 
the limits of the ordinary uses of our words. Edward Minar acknowledges this point as 
well in his article “Wittgenstein on the Metaphysics of the Self: The Dialectic of 
Solipsism in the Philosophical Investigations”: 
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 This Wittgensteinian line of thought, I believe, constitutes a considerable 
criticism. From the philosopher’s perspective, however, it continues to ring hollow. For 
him, it is no surprise that the function of ‘I’ is different from that of paradigmatic 
referring expressions; why else does he start searching for the peculiar entity to which ‘I’ 
must refer? The solipsist agrees, indeed insists, that subject-uses of ‘I’ do not meet the 
conditions that would yield a rich notion of reference; they lead to no worldly entity, 
however special. Although ‘I’ does not, on the solipsist’s view, pick out an individual of 
an established kind, it must direct attention to a special subject position. Presented with 
conditions on ordinary reference that his search for a self must apparently meet, and with 
reasons (in the world, as it were) that he cannot meet them, the solipsist will question 
whether he needs to be responsible to these requirements. (Minar 1998, p. 339-40) 
 
This is a legitimate response of the solipsist. Perhaps she means something different than 
what she seems to mean when she says that “I” refers to a transcendental Self. However, 
we have built up a fair amount of machinery to deal more thoroughly with the solipsist. 
 Using our earlier results, let us analyze the meaning of the phrase “I am in pain”. 
The meanings of this and other similar first person psychological avowals comprise the 
evidence for the metaphysical solipsist’s position. If we can show that the meanings of 
these phrases do not provide any support for the solipsist, then their position will be 
stripped of its foundation and collapse. The first thing to note is that “I am in pain” is 
used in remarkably similar situations that groaning is, often occurring simultaneously. 
There is a sense in which groaning ‘refers’. It refers in so far as it draws attention to a 
particular person. Minar discusses this difference as well: 
 How has the conclusion that the ‘I’ in ‘I am in pain’ does not point to a person 
been reached? It can hardly be denied that the use of the sentence calls attention to the 
person who utters the words and in this limited sense distinguishes him from others (see 
S 406). Further, the uttering of the words licenses the conclusion that someone is in pain 
(see S 407). These facts alone do not, however, evidence a self to which ‘I’ serves to 
refer. They do not, in particular differentiate saying ‘I am in pain’ from groaning. A 
groan will manage to call attention to someone, but clearly without naming or referring to 
that person. (Minar 1998, p. 337) 
 
 It is clear that the meaning of groaning does not refer to any kind of subject. Raising our 
hand, screaming, or doing anything to call attention to ourselves is not paradigmatic of 
singular referring terms. Recall that the meaningfulness of any expression is completely 
bound up in the circumstances and actions particular to its occurrence. Now the essential 
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line of argument is fairly straightforward: the meanings of both of these expressions are 
more or less equivalent, and yet we know that groaning has no trace of referring to a 
transcendental Self.21 Therefore, “I am in pain” does not refer to a Self either, thereby 
disarming metaphysical solipsism.  
 This conclusion faces some initial objections and so needs elaboration. The 
solipsist might want to insist that even though she cannot express her point in her 
behavior or language that she knows what she ‘means’ anyway. After all, surely only I 
have THIS pain! This kind of statement rings of the kind of privacy we have been 
fighting against. Private acts of mental ostensive definition do not establish the meanings 
of our words and actions. So if the solipsist insists that her phrase “Only my experiences 
are real” means something, then its meaningfulness cannot extend beyond the action 
coordinate with it. This means that it will have to, in principle, be able to be 
communicated to another person. The meaningfulness of any expression lies in its use, in 
its actual instantiation, and so in principle should be observable by anyone else. It is true 
that we allowed for a kind of private language in chapter three, but this language is not in 
principle shut off from the possibility of anyone else’s learning it. The essential part of 
the positive private language argument (PLA) was that someone could develop a 
language while isolated from a community of people, not that someone could have a 
language that no one could ever understand. The position criticized by the negative PLA 
                                                 
21
 I say ‘more or less’ equivalent to acknowledge a possible source of slight divergence in meaning 
between the two expressions. “I am in pain” is a particular occurrence of the general form “I am X”, 
where “X” can be any psychological state. Groaning is not the instantiation of any general form, and so 
we might be inclined to believe that there is a difference in meaning between the two expressions. 
However, I argue that the mere grammatical fact of our language that allows us to talk about general 
forms of propositions does not give us genuine insight into the meanings of particular utterances of 
phrases like “I am in pain” in their actual uses. “I am in pain” and “I am happy” might be 
grammatically very similar in ways that groaning and cries of joy are not, but the actual uses of 
groaning and “I am in pain” are extremely similar, as are the uses of “I am happy” and cries of joy. 
These similarities are what is important for meaning. 
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allows for the possibility of such a language, but it is untenable due to the incoherencies 
that follow from its traditional assumption about meaning (TA).  This brings our 
discussion full circle: the thesis the solipsist asserts lacks genuine meaning because they 
cannot ‘mean’ anything privately.  
 As in the case of the epistemological solipsist, the metaphysical solipsist has been 
tricked by the difference in grammar between legitimate cases of reference and the 
grammar governing first person avowals of psychological states. We need to reject the 
‘model of object and designation’ when we consider the meaning of the word “I”, for the 
self is not an object. (“‘I’ is not the name of a person, […] (PI 410)) Just as numbers and 
mental states are not objects, the self eludes ostensive definition. As in the case of mental 
states, we can meaningfully talk about the self despite the fact that it is not an ‘object’.  
 This concludes the link between Wittgenstein’s discussion of rules, meaning, 
private language, mental states, and the self, although it leaves us with decidedly negative 
conclusions. Wittgenstein wants to retain the meaningfulness of words “myself”, “I”, 
“self-knowledge” and the like, but he does not give very helpful ideas as to how this 
should be done. We are supposed to simply look at their employment and see the 
meaning there. The problem with this response is that we have been so far removed from 
the real meanings of phrases that use these words that assumptions like TA, CA, and SA 
have deeply permeated our thought. Dismissing these assumptions moves us in the right 
direction but leaves us short of genuine insight into the real meanings of words used to 
discuss ‘the self’. While the later Wittgenstein advanced a kind of holism that we have 
been working to understand, this holism does not give us a positive account of the self. 
Rather, it gives us powerful reasons for dismissing assumptions thoroughly ingrained in 
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our conception of these problems, which is no small accomplishment. The epilogue that 
follows serves as my attempt to end on a positive note. There does seem to be genuine 
work that still needs to be done, even if we accept Wittgenstein’s conclusions, and I take 
this opportunity to show where I think we should direct our efforts. 
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Epilogue: 
Final Thoughts and Suggestions for Future Research 
 This essay has been concerned with following a line of thought through 
Wittgenstein’s views on the meaningfulness of language to his discussion of solipsism 
and the self, but in doing so it also defends Wittgenstein’s position as a tenable 
alternative to theories endorsing any combination of TA, CA, or SA. Wittgenstein’s 
position gives us powerful tools against some traditionally overwhelming problems, 
namely the mind/body problem and the threat of solipsism. The best immediate upshot of 
the essay is that we do not have to spend our future efforts looking for ‘a self’ that is an 
object, much less how one privately has sensations in their minds. Neither sensations nor 
the selves are objects, and so it does not make sense to ask about how the self ‘has’ 
sensations. However, this and our other conclusions have been primarily negative. This 
epilogue addresses two questions: where should our future efforts be directed and is there 
any positive conclusions we might draw about ourselves from these meditations. 
 There are several areas of this essay that could be spring boards for further 
research. While tangential to the core of the arguments in this essay, the epistemological 
questions raised in the third chapter demand further exploration. The role of custom and 
the ensuing relativism between forms of life raises important questions about correcting 
others’ uses of words. Perhaps the training each of us received differs to such a slight 
degree that we all slightly differ in our uses of words. We need to see how this might 
affect meaningful communication between members of the same language community. 
There also seems to be an important relationship between the notion of our highly 
complicated extended language games and art. This essay portrays the construction of 
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meaningful language as an exploration of a limitless horizon, where the value in our 
quest is up to us. Art seems to be one of the most frequented harbors from which we 
embark on these adventures, but the extent to which this metaphor is accurate will depend 
on greater thought and discussion. On a similar note, the relationship between ethics and 
our conclusions demands further attention. Our status as moral agents is most likely 
affected in some way by the denial that our selves are ‘objects’. Finally, the pursuit of a 
direct solution to Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations should not be abandoned 
entirely. Frege and Russell’s responses, as portrayed here, do not appear adequate, and 
chapter two merely serves as a possible account of meaning that rejects the traditional 
assumptions about meaning that lead us into these problems. However, I do not claim that 
any direct solution is impossible in principle. I have mere argued that highly influential 
accounts fail and that we can hold on to a coherent theory of meaning while rejecting 
traditional assumptions.  
 When it comes to a more positive account of the self, Wittgenstein does not 
explicitly tell us what the meanings of words like “myself” and “I” are, much less words 
like “self-actualization” or “self-knowledge”. Yet these and related words are not just 
elements of a philosopher’s musings: they are bound up in real questions that pose 
serious problems for many people. We might admit that groaning and “I am in pain” have 
equivalent meanings, but what about questions like “What do I truly value?” or “Do I 
love this person?” The meaningfulness of these questions and their answers cannot be 
reduced to some series of primitive gestures, nor would Wittgenstein attempt such a 
reduction. A robust account of the self should not leave us in the dark about these sorts of 
questions. The focus of our philosophical inquiry should be directed at what self there is 
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that can be known, which in turn would show us how we can ‘know ourselves’ and what 
it means to know other people. We are looking for a theory that gives some genuine 
insight into what it is like to be a human being, not one plagued by misleading 
assumptions or one that stops short of answering these questions.22  
 Despite falling short of this grander goal here, Wittgenstein’s thoughts might 
serve as the foundation for a new conception of the conditions under which we acquire 
genuine self-knowledge. We have seen that the meanings of our words are connected 
with the actions and circumstances surrounding their use. This conclusion affirms some 
generally accepted but often unappreciated truisms about the relationship between 
yourself and your community. It is frequently taken for granted that your friends and 
family have genuine insights into aspects of your character of which you are otherwise 
unaware. There is a temptation to dismiss the importance of this fact on the basis that, at 
least in principle, someone with enough self-awareness would realize the true nature of 
their self independently of their friends’ input. This belief is bolstered by the apparent 
fact that we each have privileged access to some kind of substantive private knowledge 
about ourselves. Furthermore, some might take these views to claim infallible knowledge 
about their self. Each of us alone knows who we really are, and the conjectures of others 
can only have probabilistic accuracy about my true character.  
 We have denied that there is a private self serving as an object that we can 
observe through private communion. To flesh out the errors of this conception, let us 
                                                 
22
 Hans Sluga is sensitive to this issue in his article “‘Whose house is that?’ Wittgenstein on the self”. He 
considers the sentence, “I am not a genius, I am only a talent”, pointing out that the meaning of “I” in this 
case can neither be reduced to the meaning of a groan nor establish a self that is the referent. He goes on to 
argue for a constructivist conception of the self. We have the idea of a self as an object that serves as a 
necessary illusion with which we make sense of ourselves as moral and historical agents (see Sluga, p. 346-
8). It is not clear to me that we are forced into such an account given Wittgenstein’s considerations, but it is 
worth mentioning that others have tried to extend Wittgenstein’s reflections on the self into a more robust 
theory. 
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return to an example mentioned in chapter two: that of the man who sincerely said he 
loved his wife even though he neglects and beats her. Suppose this man says of himself, 
“I am a loving person”. What are we to do if we take this man at his word? As before, we 
would probably say that he is not a loving person, though he is inclined to think himself 
one. If he insists that he is, in fact, very loving, our next move would be to check if he 
means the same thing we do by “to love”. This procedure might take many forms, but 
presumably it would be analogous to our discussion of the improper use of the word 
“green” in chapter three (although the meaning of “to love” might prove more difficult to 
teach). There are three options once we reach bedrock. (1) He might acknowledge that 
“to love” really means what we mean by “hateful” or “malicious” for him, in which case 
we can all at least agree on this point. The other two options are more confusing: either 
(2) he is not able to learn the meaning of “to love” or (3) he learns or demonstrates that 
he already knows how to use “to love” correctly and yet insists that he is a loving person. 
Case (2) would be bizarre, and might only be explainable by an appeal to a different form 
of life. The third case is more important for our purposes because no one speaks past each 
other in this case. Now our response would be the same as our initial one. The point here 
is that we are right in observing that he is not a loving person and he is wrong to think 
otherwise, no matter what special private feelings he may have. No matter how 
tenaciously he holds this belief, he will not be a loving person. 
 This example demonstrates a real possible scenario where others’ observations 
can be genuinely accurate about another person’s character despite the individual’s 
contrary avowals. The greater question remains: was it in principle impossible for this 
man to have realized the falsity of his statement without the observations of others? The 
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answer seems to be no. It seems perfectly possible that this man wakes up one day to a 
terrible epiphany. But this possibility does not prove that we have a privileged private 
access to ourselves that is in principle inaccessible for anyone else. In fact, we see that 
other people can even have real knowledge about yourself in spite of your believing 
otherwise.  
 These considerations derive their strength from the elusive grammar of words like 
“I”, “myself”, “yourself”, and so on. The meanings of these words are perfectly familiar 
in so far as we use them uniformly. Things become more confusing when we ‘try to 
understand ourselves’. We have been under the illusion that “I” refers to a subject that we 
alone have access to when no such object exists. Of course, “I am a loving person” is still 
a meaningful expression, as is “I am in pain”, but the grammar of these phrases does not 
preclude others from having genuine insights into your character or mental states. We fall 
prey to the belief that we know exactly who we are because of the complimentary notions 
of privacy and the metaphysics of the self. But if we reject these ideas, as we have above, 
we see that you can learn a great deal about yourself through regular open dialogue 
between yourself and those who know you. The advice and insight of your friends and 
family is not mere conjecture. They frequently see things that you do not and listening to 
them will give you opportunities for self-knowledge and growth that would be more 
difficult to arrive at otherwise. “Myself”, then, looks to be something that is genuinely 
accessible to others. In fact, Wittgenstein’s thoughts have brought us to a more powerful 
understanding of an old truth: we are “social beings”, and by this we mean that our peers 
have direct access to our ‘selves’ in the social sphere of our lives. Moreover, we come to 
know ourselves in the midst of our fellow humans, without whom we would be apt to 
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forget and/or misconstrue our past actions into ways that distort our knowledge of 
ourselves.  
 These final meditations reveal that much work lies ahead of us. We have the 
beginnings of a more positive account of the self and spring boards for further research. 
We owe a dept to Wittgenstein’s insights, but it seems that we have many questions left 
unanswered by his account. While Wittgenstein’s thoughts may not have extended this 
far, we can use what vision he had to build something stronger than the house of cards he 
blew over.
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